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Abstract 
Over the past thirty-five years, the U.S. adult obesity rate has more than doubled from 
roughly 15% to 35%, reflecting a general diffusion of obesity across all segments of the adult 
population (United States Department of Health and Human Services).  The objective of this 
research is to identify the factors that influence adults’ healthy weight, as reflected in body 
mass index (BMI) or being obese (having a body mass index of 30 or larger), the Food Stamp 
Program (or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) participation, and the relationship 
of these two in longitudinal panel data. 
The panel data was obtained by merging the individual-level national data for the U.S. 
adults from the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), with 
external price data obtained from the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association 
(ACCRA) Cost of Living Index.  Six rounds of NLSY79 survey were extracted at a 4-year 
interval from 1986 to 2006.  Using the geocode information, the secondary data on local food, 
drinks and health care prices and labor market conditions were merged with the data on 
adults in the NLSY79. 
We used three improved economic and econometric models to examine the effect of FSP 
(or SNAP) participation on women’s BMI and likelihood of being obese.  First, least squares 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation of our benchmark model suggests that women in 
households that currently participate in the FSP (or SNAP) have a higher BMI and a higher 
probability of being obese.  Other things equal, participation in the FSP increases a woman’s 
BMI by about 1.1%, and also increases her probability of being obese by about 2.6 
percentage points.  However, concerns are sometimes raised about least squares IV estimates 
being inconsistent because no account is taken of individual (or household) fixed (or random) 
effects. 
Second, a new model of lifetime utility maximization is developed with perfect foresight, 
and the equations for BMI (and obesity) and FSP participation are estimated using the least 
squares estimator incorporating IV (for FSP and wage rate) and individual fixed effects.  
Results from this fitted model suggest that if a woman is in a household that decides to 
participate in FSP participation, it reduces her BMI by 15.67% and her probability of being 
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obese by 56.33 percentage points.  Moreover, the estimates of the individual fixed effects 
have a frequency distribution that approximates a normal, and for a significant part of the 
sample, the individual fixed effects accounts for most of the explained variation in ln(BMI) 
and the probability of being obese. 
Third, we next consider a model of lifetime utility maximization with updating and 
autocorrelation of BMI or the probability of being obese. These results suggest that if a 
woman is in a household that participates in the FSP program, it reduces here BMI by 1.12% 
and her probability of being obese by 3.76 percentage points, which is significantly lower 
than the results from the second model. 
These latter two models have considerable appeal relative to the benchmark econometric 
model.  Hence, we conclude that women in households that participate in the FSP 
participation have a lower BMI and a lower probability of being obese.  Also, we conclude 
that individual-fixed effects play a large role in understanding obesity in women.  These are 
key findings of this study.    
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Over the past thirty-five years, the U.S. adult obesity rate has more than doubled from 
roughly 15% to 35%, reflecting a general diffusion of obesity across all segments of the adult 
population (United States Department of Health and Human Services).  Obesity is a concern 
because it increases the risk for cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and most forms of cancer, 
except for lung. In addition, when adults are obese, their labor productivity and quality of life 
decline, medical expenditures increase dramatically and many die prematurely.  The U.S. 
obesity rate is the highest in the world, and obese adults are a major financial burden to 
families and also the U.S. Medicare and Medicaid Programs.  In 2008, medical costs 
associated with obesity were estimated at $147 billion; the per capita medical costs paid by 
third-party payers for people who are obese were $1,429 higher than those of normal weight 
(Ogden and Carroll 2010). 
Earlier studies of obesity of U.S. adults have largely focused on data in a single cross-
section or one round of a panel survey and tried to identify the factors that have great impacts 
on people’s body weight.  Among these factors, food prices are a major factor because they 
determine quantity demanded for food.  Etilé (2008) used French food expenditures data to 
examine the effects of food prices in twenty-three product categories on individuals’ body 
mass index (BMI) distribution for a sample of French adults.  He found that the food price 
elasticity of BMI was negative and almost always significant for cereals, breaded proteins, 
and animal and vegetable fats.  Around the median BMI, a higher price of seafood products 
(in brine and processed) increased BMI.  The price elasticity of BMI for meats in brine was 
negative, and the price elasticity around the median for snacks and ready-meals was positive.  
For fruits and vegetables in brine, he found that a higher price increased BMI, but for 
processed fruits and vegetables, a higher price reduced BMI.  
Auld and Powell (2009) used repeated cross-sectional data of adolescents drawn from 
the Monitoring the Future Survey to investigate the determinants of BMI.  They showed that 
decreases in the relative price of energy dense foods increased adolescent body weight if the 
price of obtaining a calorie from dense food was lower than that of less dense food.  Their 
results suggested that the price of high density food (fast food meals) was negatively related 
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to body weight, whereas the price of low density food (fruits and vegetables) was positively 
associated. 
In a recent study Chen (2009) showed that prices of food and drinks (for seven groups) 
contributed significantly to the explanation of adult decisions on physical activity and being 
obese for women in round 2004 of the NLSY79 data set but not for men.  Also, a higher 
opportunity cost of time of women reduced their probability of obese, while a higher 
opportunity cost of time of men raised their probability of being obese.  Women who had 
more education were more likely to be obese but men with more education were less likely to 
be obese.  She also showed that early BMI (BMI at age 25) had a large positive and 
statistically significant impact on later BMI of both men and women.  
Food from food assistance programs is one part of the food budget for some households -
-- mainly low income ones, thus affects the household members’ nutrition intakes and body 
weight.  Fox, Hamilton and Lin (2004) provided a summary of a comprehensive review and 
synthesis of published research on the impact of USDA’s domestic food and nutrition 
assistance programs on participants’ nutrition and health outcomes.  Among them, a few 
studies have attempted to link an individual’s participation in the Food Stamp Program (FSP), 
recently renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and obesity.  The 
administration of the FSP with beginning-of-the-month payments to eligible households may 
lead participating households to over-consume at the beginning of the month and to starve at 
the end of the month.  This cycling through “many mini feast and famine periods” could lead 
individuals to develop unhealthy eating habits, which in turn could contribute to obesity.  The 
empirical evidence in these studies is that FSP participation increases the probability of being 
obese although the magnitude is quite different.     
Gibson (2003) examined the relationship between FSP participation and obesity for low 
income individuals using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79).   Individual fixed-effects were used to take into account unobserved differences 
across individuals that did not vary over time.  The results indicated that both current and 
long-term FSP participation were significantly related to the obesity of low income women, 
but not of low income men.  Gibson (2004) used the same method to examine the 
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relationship in children using data from the NLSY79 Child Sample.  The models were 
estimated separately for younger (5-11 years old) and older (12-18 years old) children.  The 
results indicated that long-term FSP participation was positively and significantly related to 
being overweight for young girls, and negatively and significantly related to being 
overweight for young boys, but not significantly related to being overweight for older 
children.  However, these results are questioned because they did not consider the SNAP or 
FSP participation decision, which is endogenous.   
Chen, Yean, and Eastwood (2005) used the data from the 1994-1996 Continuing Survey 
of Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII) to examine the effects of FSP participation on two 
separate but related outcome measures: a continuous body mass index and a binary obesity 
indicator.  For each measure, a simultaneous-equation system was used to accommodate the 
endogeneity of FSP participation.  Their results indicated that FSP participation was 
positively related to bodyweight and the likelihood of being obese among low-income 
women, which suggested that women receiving FSP benefits were more likely to be obese 
due to their “distorted” food consumption caused by the food item eligibility restriction. 
Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk (2008) used the 2000-2003 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS) and information on state-level FSP characteristics to estimate the impact of 
FSP participation on weight status and health care spending among non-elderly adults.  Their 
results suggested that program participation by women led to a 5.9% increase in their 
likelihood of being overweight or obese and also to higher medical expenditures. 
The literature reviewed above has provided some guidance on those factors that might 
affect adult decisions on a healthy weight and the Food Stamp Program participation, and 
also on the method of estimating the relationship between these two outcomes.  An individual 
fixed-effects model using panel data is better than the estimations using a single cross-section 
or one round of a panel survey since it takes into account unobserved differences across 
individuals that did not vary over time.  Also, the endogeneity between adult weight and the 
FSP participation should be corrected when estimating the effect of participation on weight.  
The objective of this research is to identify the factors that affect adults’ healthy weight, 
as reflected in body mass index (BMI) or being obese (having a body mass index of 30 or 
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larger), decision of a  household to participate in the FSP (or SNAP), and the relationship of 
these two in longitudinal panel data.  The factors we are also interested in include the prices 
of food and drinks, the opportunity cost of time, and past participation in the program. 
We analyze household decision making from three different perspectives.  For each 
perspective, an economic model of household decision making on food, other purchased 
goods, health, and leisure is developed, and then a corresponding econometric model is 
developed and estimated.  In the first model, the household head makes decisions by 
maximizing household utility in each period separately while he/she does not update his/her 
decision-making process based on previous outcomes.  The corresponding empirical 
econometric model is estimated by least squares with instrumental variables.  Second, the 
household head maximizes household lifetime utility, but he/she does not update his/her 
decisions based on previous outcomes.  Dynamic programming analysis of this utility 
maximization problem provides the fundamental structure of an econometric model with IVs 
and individual fixed-effects.  Third, we extend the lifetime utility maximization problem by 
arguing that the household head takes account of previous health outcomes as he/she makes 
current decisions. An individual’s previous health outcome, which is different from other 
consumption goods, affects his/her current decisions in that it limits his/her ability to conduct 
daily activities.  The econometric model is least squares with IVs and with individual fixed 
effects and autocorrelation in the BMI or obesity equation.  
The panel data we use is obtained by merging the individual-level national data for the 
U.S. adults from the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), 
with external price data obtained from the American Chamber of Commerce Research 
Association (ACCRA) Cost of Living Index.  Six rounds of NLSY79 survey were extracted 
at a 4-year interval from 1986 to 2006.  With use of the geocode on each household, we are 
able to merge the secondary data on local food, drinks and health care prices and labor 
market conditions to the adults in the NLSY79. 
The paper provides some new insights on adult obesity in the United States and makes 
contributions to the literature in the following ways.  First, we develop economic models to 
support our empirical estimations.  This step is missing in most previous studies.  Second, 
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most economists used data for a single cross-section or one round of a panel survey to 
examine the relationship between FSP participation and BMI or obesity. With our 
longitudinal panel data we can bring more information to bear on the relationship.  Third, 
most findings in the literature are challenged because they did not control for the endogeneity 
between adult weight and participation in the FSP program, which is solved by an 
instrumental variable strategy in this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, we introduce the primary and 
secondary data sets to be used and define the variables.  In Chapter 3, 4, and 5, we analyze 
the household decision making process from three different perspectives.  In each chapter, we 
develop a theoretic model of decision making, describe the corresponding econometric model, 
discuss important hypotheses to be tested, and present empirical results.  Chapter 6 concludes.  
Appendix I provides detailed information on the food items in each food category and gives 
an example of how to calculate the relative price of each food category.  Appendix II is the 
questionnaires about non-cognitive abilities in NLSY79.  Appendix III presents the 
regression results we use to predict the household non-wage income.  The ordinary least 
squares estimations of the BMI/obesity equation are attached in Appendix IV. 
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Chapter 2. Data and Empirical Definitions of Variables 
The primary data sources for the empirical analysis comes from the individual-level 
national data for the U.S. adults from the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth, 1979 
Cohort (NLSY79), merged with external price data obtained from the American Chamber of 
Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) Cost of Living Index.   
The National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth, 1979 Cohort is a nationally 
representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 years old when they 
were first surveyed in 1979.  The survey was conducted annually from 1979 to 1994 and has 
been conducted biennially since 1996.  The most updated survey was conducted in 2006.  
Each round collected detailed information on the respondents’ health status, number of 
family members, schooling, labor market behaviors, income and expenditures, and so on.  
We extract out a sample from 6 rounds at an interval of four years, i.e. 1986, 1990, 1994, 
1998, 2002 and 2006, for two reasons.  First, after 1986, all respondents were at least of age 
21 and passed their juvenescent phase with a stable weight history.  Second, the four-year 
interval helps reduce autocorrelation. 
In 1979, the following three subsamples comprised the NLSY79 sample: (1) a cross-
sectional sample of 6,111 respondents designed to be representative of the non-
institutionalized civilian segment of young people living in the United States in 1979 and 
born between January 1, 1957, and December 31, 1964 (ages 14–21 as of December 31, 
1978);  (2) a supplemental sample of 5,295 respondents designed to oversample civilian 
Hispanic, black, and economically disadvantaged non-black/non-Hispanic youth living in the 
United States during 1979 and born between January 1, 1957, and December 31, 1964; (3) a 
sample of 1,280 respondents designed to represent the population born between January 1, 
1957, and December 31, 1961 (ages 17–21 as of December 31, 1978), and who were enlisted 
in one of the four branches of the military as of September 30, 1978. 
Following the 1984 interview, 1,079 members of the military subsample were no longer 
eligible for interview, while the rest randomly-selected 201 respondents remained in the 
survey.  We excluded these respondents from our sample because their health status or BMI 
may be related to special training and thus are less representative.  As a result, there are 
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11,406 respondents in our sample before dropping out those with missing values in key 
variables.  Table 1 explains the abbreviations and a shot description of the variables to be 
used in the econometric model. 
i) Body Mass Index (BMI) and Obesity 
BMI is a simple index of weight-for-height and is commonly used to measure health in 
literature.  It is defined as the individual's body weight (in kilograms) divided by the square 
of his or her height (in meters).  According to the World Health Organization’s classification, 
an adult’s normal weight should be between 18.5 and 25.  Persons with BMI<18.5 (kg/m2) 
are classified as being underweight, persons with BMI>=25(kg/m2) are classified as being 
overweight, and persons with BMI>=30(kg/m2) are classified as being obese. 
We construct two BMI variables: current BMI and BMI at age 20 (or put more accurately, 
BMI in the year that the respondent turned 20 years old).  Respondents’ self-reported weight 
was recorded in each round, but self-reported height was only available in round 1981, 1982, 
1985 and 2006. 
To calculate current BMI, we need to fix the problem of measurement errors and missing 
values in self-reported height.  Because the respondents were still young (aged 14–21 as of 
December 31, 1978), their height may vary (normally increase) in the 1981, 1982, 1985 
surveys.  However, after close exam of these values, we find that some respondents have 
unreasonable height history.  For instance, for some of them, the height in 1982 was much 
less than the value in 1981, or, the height in 1985 was much less than the value in 1982.  
Therefore, we use the maximum of all available height values up to the survey year as the 
respondent’s height to calculate his/her BMI in this year.  Specifically, for the observations in 
1982, we use the maximum of the available height values in 1981 and 1982 to calculate 
current BMI in 1982.  For the observations in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002, we use the 
maximum of the available height values in 1981, 1982 and 1985 to calculate BMI in these 
years.  However, in order to keep the most updated information, for the observations in 2006, 
we use the height value in 2006 to calculate current BMI when it is available and use the 
foresaid method when it is not available. 
To calculate BMI at age 20, we not only apply the same procedure to get the self-
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reported height, but also follow like rationale to approximate the missing values in self-
reported weight.  Because all respondents were born between January 1, 1957, and December 
31, 1964, they turned 20 years old between year 1977 and 1984.  For the respondents that 
were born before January 1, 1962, who turned 20 years old before January 1, 1982, we use 
their BMI in 1981 as their BMI at age 20.  For the respondents that were born in 1962, we 
follow the following procedure to get their BMI at age 20.  First, when their weight in 1982 
is available, it is used to calculate their BMI at age 20. Second, when the respondent’s weight 
is missing in 1982, we use the average of his/her weight values in 1981 and 1985 (when both 
are available) to approximate his/her weight in 1982.  Last, if the respondent’s BMI at age 20 
still cannot be calculated by the second step due to the missing of weight values in 1985, we 
use their BMI in 1981 as BMI at age 20.  Finally, for the respondents that were born after 
December 31, 1962, and turned 20 years old after December 31, 1982, we use their BMI in 
1985 as their BMI at age 20. 
ii) Food Stamp Program Participation 
The survey asked the respondents about the detailed information on the Food Stamp 
program participation in all rounds.  The questions covered the beginning date and the ending 
date of each period between the last interview and this interview in which the household 
received any food stamps, as well as the values of food stamps in each month during these 
periods.  Therefore, we can get the total amount of the food stamps the respondents received 
during each year. 
We constructed two variables representing the FSP: the index for current participation 
and the average annual amount of food stamps the respondent received between two survey 
years (referred shortly as lagged food stamps value).  If the respondent received any food 
stamps during the reported year, the index for current FSP participation equals 1, otherwise it 
is 0.  In order to check for dependence and recidivism of welfare program participation, we 
use the average annual amount of food stamps the respondent received in the last three 
calendar years between two survey rounds to represent the respondent’s participation history.  
For instance, for the observations from round 1986, the lagged food stamps value is 
calculated as taking average of the annual food stamps that the respondents received in 1983, 
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1984 and 1985.  Meanwhile, in order to check if missing previous participation history plays 
an important role in our estimations, a dummy variable is set to 1 if at least one of the annual 
food stamps values in the last three calendar years is missing, and set to 0 if all three values 
are available.  
iii) ACCRA Prices of Food, Drinks, Fast Food and Health Care 
To be consistent with the reported years of the NLSY79 data, we construct price indexes 
for food, drinks, fast food and health care in year 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2005.  
The American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA) collects data on 
prices of 63 different items in 300 U.S. cities quarterly.  These data provide useful 
information on prices of individual food items and can also be used to construct local cost of 
living indexes. The ACCRA data are collected at the establishment level and the basket of 
goods reflects a mid-management standard of living.  The sample weight for each item is 
derived from expenditure shares in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 1993 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey.  We constructed prices of food, drink, fast food and health care using all 
of the price data included in the ACCRA data set.  Although one can imagine creating better 
prices for some commodity groups, they would need prices on a much broader range of 
goods.  The methodology we use has been applied by Chou, Grossman, and Saffer (2004), 
Powell et al. (2007), Auld and Powell (2008) for the price of fast food, Keng and Huffman 
(2007) for the price of alcohol, and Auld and Powell (2008) for the price of fruits and 
vegetables.  Chen (2009) also used this method in her Ph.D. dissertation. 
The following prices for commodity groups were created: price of fresh fruits and 
vegetables (PR_FFruVeg), price of processed fruits and vegetables (PR_PFruVeg), price of 
meat and fish (PR_Meat), price of dairy foods (PR_Dairy), price of alcoholic drinks 
(PR_Alco), price of non-alcoholic drinks (PR_NAlco), price of fast food (PR_FF), and price 
of health care (PR_HC).  PR_FFruVeg is derived from prices of bananas, potatoes, and 
iceberg lettuce.  PR_PFruVeg is derived from prices of frozen corn, fresh orange juice, 
canned peaches, and canned sweet peas.  PR_Meat is derived from prices for T-bone steak, 
ground beef or hamburger, sausage, frying chicken, and chunk light tuna.  PR_Dairy is 
derived from the prices for the whole milk, eggs, margarine, and grated parmesan cheese.  
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PR_Alco is derived from prices for beer and wine.  PR_NAlco is derived from prices for 
vacuum-packed coffee and Coca Cola.  PR_FF is derived from prices for a McDonald’s 
Quarter-Pounder with cheese, an 11"-12" thin crust cheese pizza at Pizza Hut or Pizza Inn, 
and fried chicken (thigh and drumstick) at Kentucky Fried Chicken or Church’s Fried 
Chicken.  And the price of health care (PR_HC) is derived from the prices of a doctor visit, a 
dentist visit, ibuprofen (or an antibiotic in some years). (See Appendix I for more details on 
the list of items included in each component and the units priced.) 
To eliminate locational noise in the price data and to solve the problem of different units 
among purchased items, a relative price for each item was created by dividing an item’s price 
in a particular location by its average price among all the participating locations, and this real 
price was used to generate weighted consumer prices for each commodity group.  Suppose 
there are I cities in total.  Let Pki denote the price of consumption category k in city i, Pkji 
denote the price of consumption item j ( Jj ,...,2,1= ) in category k in city i, and Pkj denote 
the average price of consumption item j in category k across all participating cities in 
ACCRA (i.e. IPP
i kjikj
/∑= ).  Wkji denotes the expenditure weight of consumption item j in 
category k in city i where 1=∑ j kjiW for any k and i.  Then the price of consumption category 
k in city i is: 
iandkanyforWPPWPPWPPP kJikJkJiikkikikkikki )/(......)/()/( 222111 +++=  
where J is the total number of items belonging to consumption category k. See Appendix I 
for an example showing how the weighted price for a food group in a particular city is 
derived.1 
Not all NLSY respondents lived in an ACCRA cost of living index (CLI) participating 
city, so a different strategy was developed to obtain prices for respondents who lived in these 
                                                        
1 There are several differences in our method for constructing food and drinks prices relative to ones use in 
other studies.  First, households purchase food and drinks to produce various nutritional, social and 
psychological outcomes, and, hence, not just for calories.  Second, as in Chen (2009), I include a disaggregated 
but relatively comprehensive set of six food and drinks prices rather than one or two prices.  Third, I 
disaggregate fruits and vegetables into fresh and processed because the latter contain, on average, significant 
added sugar and less fiber, which makes them less healthful.  Fourth, non-labor income and the wage are 
deflated using the ACCRA cost of living index, which is consistent with the food, drinks, and health care price 
data. 
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areas.  First, the price index was calculated for all ACCUR CLI participating cities in the 
same state as the respondent’s residence, and then a simple average price was created across 
them.  This average price for a commodity group was then used for the price that respondents 
faced in all non-ACCRA participating cities in that state.  Because most ACCRA cost of 
living index (CLI) participating cities are urban areas in federally designated Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), this average price would be less representative for 
respondents in suburbs within MSAs or in non-MSAs.   To correct for this problem, we will 
add in some variables to control for the differences in economic status between these areas, 
such as the dummy variables that index urban areas or MSAs.  This methodology allows us 
to keep all observations rather than deleting ones outside of ACCRA cost of living cities.  It 
has been applied by Keng and Huffman (2007) for the price of alcohol.   
iv) Labor Market Variables 
The NLSY79 collects detailed information about an individual’s employers in each 
reported year.  A series of variables provide information on (1) time spent with an employer, 
i.e., start and stop dates for each job, hours, tenure, type of shift worked; (2) time spent away 
from an employer either on unpaid or paid leave, i.e., gaps within jobs; and (3) periods not 
working, i.e., gaps between jobs.  Based on this information, the total hours that a respondent 
spent on work in the reported year were provided in each round.  If the respondent reported 
no working hours, the index for labor market participation equals 0, otherwise it is 1. 
All respondents were also asked about earnings received from working in each survey, 
including military income, wages, salaries, tips, farm income, and business income.  The 
wage income we use here is the sum of wages, salaries and tips.  We then compute the hourly 
wage rate by dividing total wage income by total working hours in the reported year.  The 
real wage in each cross-section is computed by dividing the hourly wage by the ACCRA cost 
of living index for the location where the individual resides.  
v) Noncognitive Abilities. 
We are also interested in whether an individual’s non-cognitive abilities affect labor 
market outcomes.  Psychologists suggest that an individual’s psychological traits, such as 
motivation and self control, affect his or her behaviors (Dunifon and Duncan 1998).  
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However, economists have generally ignored these factors.  Starting in the late 1990’s, 
researchers have included these noncognitive factors in the models for labor market, and their 
findings confirm that noncognitive abilities seem to matter for achievement in children as 
reflected in completed schooling which in turn affects later earnings. 
Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001) used the High School and Beyond (HSB) data set 
and defined nine behavioral problems as measured by social skills in the 10th grader.  Their 
results suggested that when controlling for cognitive ability, these social skills were 
correlated with later earnings. They operated primarily through an individual’s decisions on 
schooling attainment. 
Groves (2005) used the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women in U.S. and 
women from the National Child Development Study in U.K. to explore the value of 
incorporating psychological traits into wage determination models and found that some were 
statistically significant factors.  Her results indicated that white women in the labor market 
were penalized for externality, aggression and withdrawal. 
Muller and Plug (2006) also adopted the Five-Factor Model of personality structure to 
explore how personality affected the earnings of a large group of men and women who 
graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957 and were re-interviewed in 1992.  Their 
results indicated that all five basic traits had statistically significant positive or negative 
earning effects and the overall effects were comparable to those commonly found for 
cognitive abilities.  They also suggested that different traits were rewarded by different 
magnitudes for men and women. 
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) presented an analysis of the effects of both 
cognitive and noncognitive skills on wages, schooling, work experience, occupational choice, 
and participation in a range of adolescent risky behaviors.  They showed that a model with 
one latent cognitive skill and one latent noncognitive skill explained a large array of diverse 
behaviors. 
The noncognitive measures we use are the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control 
Scale that was administered in round 1979, and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale that was 
administered in round 1980.  Groves (2005) uses the Rotter Scale in her analysis of the return 
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to personality.  Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) use the standardized average of the 
person’s scores on the Rotter and Rosenberg scales as a measure of noncognitive skills. 
The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale is a four-item abbreviated version of 
a 23-item forced-choice questionnaire adapted from the 60-item Rotter Adult I-E scale 
developed by Rotter (1966).  The scale was designed to measure the extent to which 
individuals believe they have control over their lives through self-motivation or self-
determination (internal control) as opposed to the extent that the environment (i.e., chance, 
fate, luck) controls their lives (external control).  The score for each item ranges from 1 to 4 
in the external direction: the higher the score, the more external the individual.  Since 
literature has found that people usually benefit from internal control, we construct a scale for 
internal control by reversing the score for each item.  As a result, the minimal possible total 
score of the internal control scale is 16, indicating highest internal control, while the 
minimum possible total score is 4, indicating highest external control.  
 The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was designed to measure the self-evaluation that an 
individual makes and customarily maintains.  It describes a degree of approval or disapproval 
toward oneself (Rosenberg 1965).  It contains 10 statements of self-approval and disapproval 
with which respondents are asked to strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.  
The scale for each statement ranges from 1 to 4, and is scored in the self-approval direction: 
the higher the score, the higher self-esteem.   The maximum possible score is 40 while the 
minimum possible score is 10.  The scale is widely used, and has accumulated evidence of 
validity and reliability.   
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was also administered in 1987.  We do not use it 
because personality is also affected by the success or failure in the labor market.  By using 
the scales before labor market outcomes, we can treat the noncognitive skills as exogenous.  
See Appendix II for detailed information about questions for the Rotter Internal-External 
Locus of Control Scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. 
In some regressions, we also use a comprehensive index for noncognitive abilities 
instead of two separate noncognitive scales.  We derive this comprehensive index by dividing 
the internal control scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale by their own sample standard 
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deviations first, and then taking the sum of these two standardized scales.  Nyhus and Pons 
(2005) also use the standardized average of the person’s scores on the Rotter and Rosenberg 
scales as a measure of noncognitive skills. 
vi) Basic Demographic Information and Family Background 
Round 1979 provided each respondent’s basic demographic information such as gender 
and race-ethnicity.  It also recorded detailed information about each respondent’ parents and 
growth history, from which we get father’s and mother’s education level, urban residence at 
age 14, and geographic region at age 14.  Each round of NYSL79 updates information on the 
respondent’s own education, marriages status, as well as the number of all biological and 
non-biological children and the age of each of them. 
Each round also provides detailed information on the household income.  Household real 
non-labor income in a given cross section is computed as total household income less the 
respondent’s earnings divided by the ACCRA cost of living index for the area where the 
respondent resides.  In the survey, only about 70 percent of respondents provided complete 
information on the household income, thus missing values of non-labor income are a major 
problem.  In order to keep as many observations as possible in the sample, we use predicted 
household real non-labor income instead of reported household real non-labor income by 
regressing reported household real non-labor income on all available exogenous variables 
about demographic information and family background for female sample and male sample 
separately.  Please see Appendix III for detailed regression results. 
vii) The Temporal Price Deflator 
Since the purchasing power of family non-labor income and wage rates is affected by inter-
temporal price level, the real cross-sectional income and wage rates will be adjusted for 
temporal price changes by using the implicit price deflator for personal consumption 
expenditures from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s GNP accounts (GNPDEF). This deflator 
is marginally better than the consumer price index of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (CPI) 
because the CPI is based upon a basket of goods and services while the GNPDEF incorporates 
all of the final goods produced by an economy.  This allows the GNPDEF to more accurately 
capture the effects of inflation since it is not limited to a smaller subset of goods.  
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Table 1: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
BMI Body Mass Index, defined as weight/square of height (in kg/m2) 
BMI20 BMI in the year that the respondent turned 20 years old 
D(Obese) =1 if the individual was obese (BMI≥ 30); =0 otherwise 
D(FSP) =1 if the individual participated in the Food Stamp Program; =0 otherwise 
LagFS The average annual Food Stamps the individual received during the three calendar 
years between two reported years (in 1,000 dollars) 
LagMiss =1 if at least one of the annual food stamps values in the last three calendar years is 
missing; =0 otherwise 
Wage The individual’s average hourly real wage rate 
D(empl) =1 if the individual worked for pay; =0 otherwise 
PR_FFruVeg Price of fresh fruits and vegetables 
PR_PFruVeg Price of processed fruits and vegetables 
PR_Meat Price of meat and fish 
PR_Dairy Price of diary food 
PR_Alco Price of alcoholic drinks 
PR_NAlco Price of non-alcoholic drinks 
PR_FF Price of fast food 
PR_HC Price of health care 
Edu The highest grade completed by the individual 
Rotter Scale The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale 
Internal Scale Reversed Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale 
Rosenberg Scale The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
Noncog Scale Comprehensive index for non-cognitive abilities 
Inc Predicted household real non-labor income (in 1,000 dollars) 
Height 
The individual’s maximum height record for observations before 2006, height in 
2006 for observations in 2006 (in centimeters) 
Age Age of the individual 
Married =1 if the individual was married and the spouse was present; =0 otherwise 
Kids Number of children in the household 
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Table 1: (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
Black =1 if the individual was black; =0 otherwise 
Raceoth =1 if the individual was neither white nor black; =0 otherwise 
Ed_Fath The highest grade completed by the individual’s father 
NoEdF =1 if Ed_Fath is missing; =0 otherwise 
Ed_Moth The highest grade completed by the individual’s mother 
NoEdM =1 if Ed_Moth is missing; =0 otherwise  
Urban =1 if the individual lived in an urban area; =0 otherwise 
MSA =1 if the individual lived in a metropolitan statistical area; =0 otherwise 
Urban_14 =1 if the individual lived in an urban area at age 14; =0 otherwise 
South_14 =1 in the individual lived in south at age 14; =0 otherwise 
Region  
  NE =1 if the individual lived in northeast; =0 otherwise 
  NC =1 if the individual lived in north central or middle west; =0 otherwise 
  South =1 in the individual lived in south; =0 otherwise 
  West =1 if the individual lived in west; =0 otherwise 
preg =1 if the female respondent was pregnant; =0 otherwise 
t Time trend, =1 for observations in 1986, =2 for observations in 1990, and so on 
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Chapter 3. Period Decisions without Information Updating 
In this chapter, we exam the representative household’s decisions on health status and the 
FSP participation under the assumption that the household head makes the decisions at the 
beginning of each period while he/she does not update his/her decision-making-process 
based on previous outcomes.  The corresponding empirical econometric model is least 
squares with IVs, which differs from cross-sectional studies in that FSP participation is 
treated as being endogenous.  
3.1 Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model is based on the productive household models of health by 
Huffman et al. (2006), Grossman (2000), and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983).  In each 
period, the representative household makes the decisions on adult labor supply, leisure 
activities, consumption (including food, medical care and other consumption goods), and 
participation in the Food Stamp Program (FSP) simultaneously.  Because the household head 
does not update the decision making decision based on previous outcomes, the decision 
making processes for all periods are independent from each other, and the state variables that 
affect the outcomes are all of current values except that the adult’s health status at the very 
beginning would affect the decisions of all periods. 
The agent is assumed to have a period utility function of the form 
),,(*),;,,,,( itititititititititititit ZGVFSPZLOLPHCFUU φφ −= . 
This utility function consists of two parts.  )(⋅U  is a quasi-concave utility function in which 
F  represents the food and drinks consumed, C  represents all other consumption goods 
excluding purchased medical care, H  represents the adult’s health status, LP  represents 
physically active leisure time, and LO  represents other types of leisure time.  Z  denotes the 
household’s observable characteristics, such as the household head’s gender, race, education, 
family structure, urban residency and so on, and φ  denotes other unobservable factors 
affecting the household’s preferences.  The household also makes the decision to participate 
in the Food Stamp Program, which is represented by an indicator FSP .  )(⋅V  is the disutility 
function associated with FSP participation since the literature has attributed a part of the 
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decline in the Food Stamp Program participation to the welfare-reform-related stigma.  The 
level of disutility is affected by the household’s own observable and unobservable 
characteristics (i.e. Z and φ ) as well as by a variety of world factors in the environment (all 
represented by G ), such as laws and regulations and people’s attitude to welfare programs. 
The household can improve the adult’s health status by consuming food and drinks, 
working out and purchasing medical care (denoted by M).  Specifically, the health production 
function is given by 
),,;,,( ititeitititit ZHMLPFHH ϕ= , 
where eH  denotes original health status at the very beginning and ϕ  denotes other 
unobservables that affect the adult’s efficiency in accumulating good health, for instance 
genetic disposition and distress. 
The household faces three constraints.  First, the food and drinks consumed is either 
purchased by using the household’s cash income or provided by the Food Stamp Program, 
),;(* itititititit GZYFSBFSPXF += . 
Here, X  represents the food and drinks the household purchases from its cash income, and 
FSB  represents the benefits provided by the Food Stamp Program, which depend on the 
household total income (denoted by Y ), the household head’s observable characteristics Z
(such as age, being disable, being a single mother, etc.) and environmental factors G (mainly 
laws and regulations).  Hence, foods purchased from cash income and from food stamps are 
treated as perfect substitutes. 
Second, the household purchases all goods subject to his/her cash income constraint.  Let 
P  denote the cost of goods with subscripts representing different goods and W  denote the 
nominal wage.  Then, with XP being the price of directly purchased food and that acquired by 
the FSP, the cash income constraint is 
ititititititittMittCititititittX VLWYGFSCFSPMPCPGZYFSBFSPFP +==−++− )(*)),;(*( ,,, , 
where L  is the time spent for wage work, V  is the non-wage income, and FSC  is the 
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monetary costs of participating in the Food Stamp Program (for example, transportation 
costs). 
Third, the adult assigns his/her time up to fixed time endowment T , i.e., 
TGFSTFSPLOLPL ititititit =+++ )(* , 
where FST  is the amount of time that the adult has to spend on the FSP participation. 
Therefore, in period t, the representative agent i’s utility maximization problem is to 
0,0,0,0,0,0
)(*
)(*)),;(*(
),,;,,(..
),,(*),;,,,,(
,,,
≥≥≥≥≥≥
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=
−=
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Since application for participation in the Food Stamp Program is a yes-or-no decision, 
the agent’s utility maximization problem can be viewed as a two-step problem.  In the first 
step, the agent maximizes his/her utility conditional on his/her decision on participation and 
gets a maximized indirect utility level.  In the second step, the agent compares these two 
conditional indirect utilities and makes the decision on participation to get a higher level of 
utility. 
In all, we can solve for an interior solution for the agent’s optimal decision on the Food 
Stamp Program participation ( *itFSP ), optimal consumptions of different goods 
( **** ,,, itititit MCFX ), optimal time allocation (
*** ,, ititit LLOLP ), and optimal health status (
*
itH ) and 
obtain the following implicit functions 
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where ite  includes itφ  and itϕ , i.e., all unobservable factors that affect the individual’s 
preferences and efficiency in accumulating good health.  These equations will be the basis of 
the econometric model. 
3.2 Econometric Model 
The NLSY data do not contain information on purchases of food, health care or time 
allocated to leisure. Hence, the econometric model focuses on adult choices of a healthy 
weight and Food Stamp Program participation.  Since an adult’s weight may affect his or her 
wage rate, and hence, the opportunity cost of time, I also fit a wage equation and use it to 
instrument an individual’s price of time.  Four equations are to be estimated, among which, 
Equation 1 and 2 are primary equations while Equation 3 and 4 are auxiliary equations.  
Please refer to Appendix IV for ordinary least squares estimations of Equation 1 without 
instrument variable strategies. 
Equation 1: Demand for Health 
Equation 1 is to explain an individual’s demand for health as indexed by BMI or being 
obese.  An individual’s body weight is affected by net energy balance, which is the net 
difference between calories consumed in work and exercise versus calories intake.  In the 
long run, if net energy balance is positive, individuals gain weight, and if it is negative, they 
lose weight.  For some individuals, they may be in equilibrium with no net change in weight 
or BMI.  Therefore, those factors that affect an individual’s decision on energy intake and 
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energy consumption are the determinants of his/her body weight. 
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First of all, I am particularly interested in the effect of the FSP participation on a 
woman’s body weight.  Previously research has reported significant effects of the FSP 
participation on an individual’s probability of being overweight although the effects tend to 
differ across subpopulations.  Based on the review of the literature, we hypothesize that 
adults who participate in the FSP are more likely to be obese. 
Most studies on FSP participation and obesity treat the FSP participation as exogenous to 
other individual and household decisions.  However, overweight people are more likely to 
participate in the FSP or have higher benefits because they are more likely to suffer from 
health restrictions and some diseases, and thus to have a lower level of income.  Even when 
income is controlled, FSP participation and BMI may still be correlated.  Townsent et al. 
(2001) found that food insecurity was positively related to the likelihood of being obese for 
women.  Meanwhile, food insecure people are more likely to participate in the FSP.  Thus, 
failure to accommodate the possible endogeneity of the FSP participation decision can lead to 
biased estimates of the effects of FSP participation on BMI.  Hence, I use Equation 2 to 
estimate the predicted probability of current FSP participation instead of the index for 
participation so that I can obtain consistent estimates. 
Second, the opportunity cost of time is important to decisions on time and goods 
allocation.  If an individual’s price of time is high, then he or she will tend to conserve on 
time-intensive activities.  Recreational exercise is a time-intensive activity, but it also 
contributes to a healthy weight.  On the other hand, individuals with a higher opportunity 
cost of time may try to build their health more effectively and efficiently, if they spend some 
time on physical activities, by hiring professional trainers.  Overall, we hypothesize that 
individuals who have a higher opportunity cost of time are more likely to be obese.  
Third, individuals consume food and drinks to obtain nutrients (carbohydrates, fats, 
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protein, vitamins and minerals), to feel good (i.e., comfort food), and to socialize.  The prices 
of disaggregated food and drinks are one set of factors that are expected to affect choices of 
food and drinks as well as physical activities, and thus affect his/her body weight (Chen 
2009).  An increase in the price of fresh fruits and vegetables is expected to reduce an 
individual’s consumption of these products and to lead to a higher BMI or probability of 
being obese.  An increase in the price of processed fruits and vegetables, which generally 
contain significant amounts of added sugar, will reduce the consumption of these foods and 
lower BMI and the probability of being obese.  An increase in the price of meats and fish is 
expected to reduce an individual’s consumption of these foods, which tend to be calorie 
dense, and may lead to a lower BMI and probability of being obese.  Similarly, since most 
fast foods are calorie dense, an increase in the price of fast foods is expected to reduce an 
individual’s consumption of these foods and thus lead to a lower BMI and probability of 
being obese.  I am uncertain about the effects of the prices of dairy products, alcoholic drinks 
and non-alcoholic drinks on BMI and the probability of being obese.  A higher price of health 
care is expected to shift attention to lifestyle production of good health and reduce the 
probability that an individual is obese.  
Fourth, an individual’s education increases his/her labor market skills, and skills in 
general, for decision making (Schultz 1975, Huffman 2001, Speakman et al. 2005).  I 
hypothesize that individuals with more education will make healthier lifestyle choices.  
However, added education increases the likelihood that an individual selects a sedentary job, 
which is a potential cause for overweight.  Previous studies find that women with higher 
education are more likely to be obese while men with higher education are less likely to be 
obese (Chen 2009). 
Fifth, as suggested in Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), an individual’s lifestyle 
choices may be affected by his/her non-cognitive abilities.  If an individual exhibits internal 
control or high self-esteem, he/she will take responsibility for his/her own actions and pursue 
a healthy lifestyle, including maintain a healthy weight.   
Sixth, to explore the possibility of a “long reach” of early events on an adult’s later taste 
for a healthy weight, an individual’s BMI at age 20 and race-ethnicity (dummy variables for 
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being black or of other races) are hypothesized to be determinants of the current demand for 
health. 
Seventh, the nonlabor income is found to have a negative effect on BMI by Chen (2009).  
A non-linear income effect will also be tested because, when the household income is 
extremely low, an individual could be underweight due to malnutrition, and when the income 
is relatively low, he/she could be overweight due to unbalanced diet.  
Eighth, there is strong empirical evidence that BMI tends to vary with age, generally 
increasing from young adulthood to the 60s and then tending to decline.  Hence, an 
individual’s age is expected to have a non-linear effect on the probability that an individual is 
obese. 
Ninth, an individual’s lifestyle choices are affected by his/her family structure. Married 
individuals or individuals with more children are expected to live to older ages and to choose 
healthier lifestyles, including a normal weight. 
Tenth, an individual’s current urban (versus rural) residence and regional location may 
affect his/her health status because of the different costs of health production.  For example, 
in more rural areas, space for physically active leisure is cheaper, and space and good soils 
are more likely to be available for a vegetable garden.   
Finally, an indicator for being pregnant is added to the equation to control for the fact 
that women are expected to gain 20-35 pounds during a healthy pregnancy, which increases 
their BMI.  
To operationalize the equation for the probability of an individual being obese, we define 
a latent variable for an individual being obese as *iObese , and then the latent regression 
equation (Greene 2003) is defined as iii XObese 11
* µ+B= .  However, we observe the 
following variable:   
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Now, the probability of the individual being obese can be expressed as 
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Where ii 11 µξ −=  and )(⋅F  is a cumulative distribution function for i1µ  evaluated at BiX1  .  If 
i1ξ  is a proper diffuse or uniform distribution centered at zero, it has a triangular cumulative 
distribution function indexed on BiX1 .  Hence, 1 1 1Pr( ( ) 1) ( )i i i ip D Obese F X X= = = B = B
because of the special form of )(⋅F .  The linear probability model for obesity is then 
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Equation 2: Food Stamp Program Participation 
Equation 2 is to identify an individual’s decision on current FSP participation, and is 
used to provide the predicted probability of current participation for Equation 1.  Most FSP 
rules are set at a federal level, but states do have a say about some administrative features 
such as the length of eligibility certification periods, the design of outreach programs and 
about any “workfare” requirements for participation in the program.  Currently, the Food 
Stamp Program operates as follows: the FSP household is defined as either a person living 
alone or a group of people who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare 
meals together.  Households have to go through an eligibility determination, and monthly 
cash income is the main determinant of eligibility. 
The FSP uses both the household’s gross monthly income and its net monthly income.  
Gross income includes all of the household’s cash income from most sources, including 
income from welfare programs.  Net income is derived by subtracting out a standard 
deduction, which is 20 percent of earned income, and also deductions for shelter and child 
care.  Households must have a gross income that does not exceed 130 percent of the federal 
poverty guidelines, and a net monthly income that does not exceed the federal poverty line.  
Finally, household assets must be less than $2,000.  Benefits are calculated by taking the 
maximum benefit level for a household of a certain size and subtracting 30 percent of the net 
income. 
Some literature tried to identify the factors that would affect a household’s decision on 
the FSP participation.  For instance, Capps and Kramer (1985) compared Probit model and 
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Logit model to analyze the FSP participation decision of a nationwide sample of households 
from the 1972-73 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Diary Survey (CEDS).  
Their results suggested that race, education level, income level, regions and the level of 
benefits were all significant factors     
In the later 1990’s, the FSP saw an unprecedented decline in participation from 27.5 
million participants in 1994 to 18.2 million participants in 1999 (USDAFSP).  After looking 
at those families who left the FSP, researchers found that most food stamp leavers had 
incomes that still left them eligible for these benefits and that former welfare recipients left 
the FSP at higher rates than families who had not received assistance before.  As a result, 
there was a wave of research trying to identify those factors that caused the declines in 
participation. 
Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor (1999) conducted an experiment to find out whether some 
eligible households failed to participate because of a lack of information concerning their 
eligibility, the level of benefits, or logistics of the application process.  Their findings showed 
that among those non-participants truly eligible for food stamps, providing information 
caused a significant increase in participation.  However, there was evidence that the initial 
lack of information was endogenous: eligible households that did not participate were 
generally entitled to small benefits. 
In a report to USDA, Wilde et al. (2000) analyzed how a strong economy and changes in 
social welfare programs drove the decline in participation.  Calculations using state-level 
data indicated that 35 percent of the caseload decline from 1994 to 1998 was associated with 
changing economic conditions and 12 percent with program reform and political variables.  
An analysis of household-level data from the Current Population Survey led to the 
conclusion that 28 percent of the total change in participation was associated with a decrease 
in the number of people with low income and 55 percent was due to a decline in the 
proportion of low-income people who participated.  In another report on older participants, 
Wilde and Dagata (2002) reported that those low-income older Americans who faced the 
most severe concerns about their health and food security situation were more likely to take 
the necessary steps to participate in the Food Stamp Program. 
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Currie and Grogger (2001) tried to explain the declines in FSP participation by three 
factors: welfare reform, the stigma and the transaction costs associated with participation, 
and the economic boom.  They found that both decreases in the unemployment rate and the 
occurrence of welfare reform contributed to the declines in FSP caseloads.  Specifically, 
among households with incomes less than 300 percent of poverty, changes in unemployment 
accounted for 20 percent of the decrease in FSP participation between 1993 and 1998, while 
the welfare reform accounted for 30 percent. 
Our equation for current FSP participation is based on an assumption about “reservation 
award”.  Similar to the reservation wage theory, we assume that an individual will participate 
in the Food Stamp Program when his/her potential award from participation is greater than 
his/her reservation award.  Such awards may be measured either by money or by utility.  
Specifically, potential award and reservation award are determined by these two equations 
respectively: 
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The PA equation determines the potential award when the agent applies for food stamps.  
It includes all determinants of eligibility that are available in the data, such as wage income, 
non-wage income, family size (marriage status and number of children), and number of 
children that need childcare expenses.  The error term 1e  represents the unavailable 
determinants of eligibility and the unobservable approval process. 
The RA equation measures the agent’s reservation award and includes all the factors that 
would affect the monetary value of food stamps and also the satisfaction or disutility 
associated with participation.   The error term 2e  captures the unobservable heterogeneity 
across individuals. 
Therefore, the agent would participate in the Food Stamp Program if his/her participation 
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award is greater than his/her reservation award.  We define a latent variable iii PARAFSP −=
* , 
which has the following relationship in Equation 2: 
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However, we observe the following variable: 
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Now the probability of the individual participating in the FSP can be expressed as 
)()Pr()0Pr()0Pr()1)(Pr( 22222
*
2 Θ=Θ<=<+Θ−=<=== iiiiiiii XFXXFSPFSPDp ξξ , 
where ii 22 µξ −=  and )(⋅F  is a cumulative uniform distribution function for i2µ  evaluated at
ΘiX 2 .  If i2µ  is a proper diffuse or uniform distribution centered at zero, it has a triangular 
cumulative distribution function indexed on ΘiX 2 .  Hence, Θ=Θ= iii XXFp 222 )(  because of 
the special form of )(⋅F .  The linear probability model for FSP participation is then 
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Given that there is some time required to apply for and maintain FSP participation, 
individuals that have a higher opportunity cost of time are less likely to participate, other 
things equal.  Since the FSP provides a substitute for some directly purchased food, an 
individual is expected to be more likely to participate in the program as the food prices 
increase. 
 I am uncertain whether an individual’s cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills affect 
decisions on his/her household’s FSP participation.  But clearly, individuals in household 
with larger amounts of non-labor income will be less likely to participate in the Food Stamp 
Program, other things equal.  Married individuals are expected to be less likely to participate 
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in the Food Stamp Program because they could obtain financial support from their spouse, 
but individuals with more children are expected to be more likely to participate because of 
the heavier financial burden.  Individuals in urban areas and more developed regions may be 
less likely to participate in the FSP because of the higher average income level and less 
friendly attitude toward the welfare programs.  Women in non MSA areas may be less likely 
to participate in the FSP because of the added costs of participation. 
Individuals who have participated in the FSP in the past are expected to be more likely to 
currently participate.  The reorganization of the welfare program for needy families in 1996 
caused a disturbance in the decisions of households to participate in welfare programs as well 
as the FSP.  Hence, we include a dummy variable taking 1 in 1996 and later years (and zero 
otherwise).  This will allow for a general change in willingness to participate by pre- and 
post-welfare reform.  A time trend is added in the equation to capture the change of economy 
that is not captured by all other explanatory variables.  Since these factors do not affect an 
individual’s body weight, they also help to identify the FSP participation from the BMI or 
obesity equation.  
We also include some variables to summarize family background effects and impacts of 
experiences in adolescence such as parents’ education and residence at age 14. These 
variables may affect an individual’s attitude towards welfare program.  These variables also 
work for identification purpose besides their own affects on the FSP participation.  An 
individual’s family attributes and community environment during adolescence may have an 
effect on his/her current body weight by affecting his/her choice on lifestyle.  However, 
because the BMI at age 20 should have captured all these effects, they could be deleted from 
the BMI and obesity equations after the BMI at age 20 is controlling for. 
Equation 3 and 4: Hourly Wage Rate and Probability of Employment 
We have each individual’s reported hourly wage in the data.  However, an individual’s 
reported hourly wage is endogenous in Equation 1 and 2 because it may be affected by 
his/her health status or welfare program participation.  For example, literature has proved that 
an adult’s weight affects his or her wage rate (Baum and Ford 2004; Cawley 2004).  Another 
possibility is that the hourly wage, health status, and welfare program participation are all 
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affected by some factors that are not available in the data, for instance, an individual’s 
occupation or working environment.  Thus, we use Equation 3, the hourly wage equation, to 
estimate the predicted hourly wage rate, and use it instead of the reported hourly wage to 
index an individual’s opportunity cost of time.  This equation is not only interesting itself 
because it related an individual’s human capital attributes to his or her wage, but it also 
facilitates keeping all observations in the data set together by providing a predicted wage for 
those who were not working or did not report working status. In these cases, the predicted 
wage is a proxy variable for the individual’s opportunity cost of time.  
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I expect an individual’s wage to increase with cognitive skills (as indexed by education 
level) and non-cognitive abilities.  An individual’s age rather than his or her labor market 
experience is used to represent current and pass incentives to invest in experience, given 
schooling.  I expect an individual’s wage to increase but at a decreasing rate as he or she 
becomes older.  Those who are black or of other races are expected to earn lower wages than 
white people.  An individual’s early BMI is also expected to affect his current wage although 
may work in different ways for different populations.  Thus a non-linear effect is permitted.  
According to the wage compensation theory, married people may earn a higher hourly wage 
rate if they give up some non-wage compensation (for instance, health insurance) because 
they could get them through their spouse.  Individuals in rural areas and less developed 
regions are expected to earn a lower hourly wage rate.  The parents’ education levels are 
expected to have a positive effect on a person’s wage rate.  Finally, a time trend is added in 
the equation to capture any trend in real wage rates over the sample period.  Because people 
who are taller are expected to earn a higher wage rate, other things equal (Keng and Huffman 
2007), we use an individual’s height to identify the wage equation from Equation 1 and 2. 
Individuals are assumed to work for a wage when the opportunity cost of their time (or 
the reservation wage) is less than their wage offer.  Thus, working for pay is a rational 
decision leading to potential selection issues, and such decision must be controlled in fitting 
the wage equation (Heckman 1979).  Under plausible assumptions this discrete outcome can 
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be approximately estimated by the Probit equation on labor market participation (Equation 4).   
We define a latent variable *iempl , which has the following relationship:  
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Then the probability of the individual working for pay can be expressed as 
)()Pr()0Pr()0Pr()1)(Pr( 44444
*
4 LΦ=L<=<+L−=<=== iiiiiiii XXXemplemplDp ξξ , 
where ii 44 µξ −=  and )(⋅Φ  is a cumulative normal distribution function for i4µ  evaluated at
LiX 4 .  Hence, Equation 4 can be fitted as a Probit model. 
Since Equation 4 is a reduced form equation, almost all signs are uncertain.  However, if 
leisure is a normal good, the income effect should have a negative sign.  From this equation, I 
can obtain the predicted probability of labor market participation, which is then used to get 
the inverse Mills ratio term in the wage equation.  The selectivity-corrected wage equation is 
then fitted to those observations that reported positive hours of labor market work to get 
unbiased estimates.  Since the fitted wage equations are now fixed up for selectivity, each 
individual’s wage (whether they actually worked for pay or not) can be predicted by setting 
the probability of participating in labor market to one.  This predicted wage is a proxy or 
indicator variable for the true opportunity cost of time of each individual (Greene 2003). 
Heckman’s two-stage estimation works better when the first-stage estimation includes 
good instrument variables for identification purpose.  In our case, local prices, nonwage 
income, past FSP participation, residence at age 14, the number of children, and a dummy for 
being pregnant are used because they would affect a person’s decision to participate in the 
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labor market, but would not affect his/her real wage rate once he/she gets a job.   
Hence, the above four equations are the focus of the econometric estimation for the first 
model.  To summarize, I control for individual heterogeneity using data on observables or 
measured attributes, and also instrument for an individual’s hourly wage rate and the 
probability that their household participates in the Food Stamp Program.  Consequently, in 
this chapter, the estimation of the econometric model is best described as least squares with 
IVs.  The labor force participation equation (Equation 4) is to be fitted to data for both those 
who work for a wage and those that do not, and the resulting coefficients are used to predict 
the probability of participation.  This ties into the IV for Heckman sample selection 
correction term in the wage equation (Equation 3).  Equation 3 is then fitted to obtain 
unbiased estimates of the wage equation, and after shutting down the sample selection effect, 
it is used to create an instrument for an individual’s hourly wage covering both labor force 
participants and nonparticipants.  After that, Equation 2 is estimated to learn about the 
determinants of a household’s participation in the FSP, but also this equation is used the 
create an IV for a household’s FSP participation.  Finally, Equation 1 (ln(BMI) and 
probability of being obese) is estimated including instruments for the individual’s wage and 
FSP participation. 
The least squares IV estimation is often questioned in the literature because it fails to 
control for observed and unobserved fixed effects that may affect a household’s and its 
members’ lifestyle choices.  Hence, these results are used as one benchmark for comparison 
of other modeling strategies.  Please refer to Table 2 for expected effects of main independent 
variables in these four equations.  To be consistent with later estimated models, the discrete 
choice models for labor force participation (Equation 1) and for FSP participation (Equation 
2) are fitted using the linear probability model instead of the Probit model.  Recall that a key 
property of these equations is that they generate a consistent but not necessarily efficient 
prediction (Greene 2003).    
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Table 2: Expected Effects of Main Independent Variables in Equation 1-4 
Variable lnBMI/D(Obese) D(FSP) lnWage empl* 
D(FSP) +    
lnWage + -   
Pr(D(empl)=1)   +  
PR_FFruVeg + +  +/- 
PR_PFruVeg - +  +/- 
PR_Meat - +  +/- 
PR_Dairy +/- +  +/- 
PR_Alco +/- +  +/- 
PR_NAlco +/- +  +/- 
PR_FF - +  +/- 
PR_HC - +  +/- 
Inc - -  - 
LagFS  +   
Edu +/- +/- + +/- 
NonCogAb - +/- + +/- 
Married - - + +/- 
Kids - +  +/- 
DUM96  +   
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3.3 Sample Description 
To reduce measurement error problems, I limit the sample to individuals with a BMI 
between 16 and 40.  Because of important biological differences, differences in past 
decisions on investments in human capital, and past labor force participation decisions, 
estimations are undertaken on male and female samples separately.  Some women were 
pregnant in survey years, and to keep them in the sample, a dummy for pregnancy (preg) is 
included in the estimations for the female sample.  Because I didn’t find significant results 
for the male sample, the discussion in this paper focuses on the female sample. 
There are a total of 20,750 observations in the female sample—20.4% of which came 
from round 1986, 19.5% from round 1990, 16.1% from round 1994, 15.6% from round 1998, 
15.1% from round 2002 and 13.4% from round 2006.  About 55.5% of female individuals are 
white, 28.3% are black, and 16.2% are of other races. Their average height was 164 
centimeters (about 65 inches).  The average BMI at age 20 was 22.1, while the average BMI 
in 1986 was 23.2 and increased to 27.3 in 2006 with a rate of about 0.2 units per year.  
Among these female individuals, 18.4% were obese and 11.5% ever participated in the Food 
Stamp Program.  82% of female adults worked for pay with an average hourly wage rate of 
10.49 dollars.   The female sample’s average education level, the measure for cognitive 
abilities, was 11.5 years.  As for measures for non-cognitive abilities, the mean of Internal 
Scale was 8.38, the mean of Rosenberg Scale was 32.1, and the mean of the comprehensive 
index for noncognitive abilities was 13.53.  53.6% were married, and the average number of 
children in the household was 1.38.  75.7% of female adults lived in urban areas and 56.1% 
lived in metropolitan statistical areas.  Please see Table 3 for summary statistics of key 
variables for the female sample. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Key Variables for Female Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BMI 25.27 5.02 16.04 39.94 
D(Obese) 0.184 0.387 0 1 
BMI20 22.07 3.42 16.14 39.94 
D(FSP) 0.115 0.319 0 1 
LagFS (in $1,000) 0.18 0.64 0 27.48 
D(empl) 0.820 0.384 0 1 
Wage (if worked for pay) 10.49 27.71 0 2,087 
Inc  (in $1,000) 20.9 20.6 -31.1 79.1 
Height 164 6.73 132 193 
age 36.88 7.15 21 50 
Black 0.283 0.450 0 1 
RaceOth 0.162 0.368 0 1 
Edu 11.481 4.40 0 20 
Rotter Scale 11.62 1.49 8 16 
Internal Scale 8.38 1.49 4 12 
Rosenberg Scale 32.10 4.07 16 40 
Noncog Scale 13.53 1.56 7.61 17.66 
Married 0.536 0.499 0 1 
Kids 1.38 1.25 0 9 
Ed_Moth 10.38 3.80 0 20 
Ed_Fath 9.44 5.21 0 20 
Urban 0.757 0.429 0 1 
MSA 0.561 0.496 0 1 
NC 0.252 0.434 0 1 
South 0.421 0.494 0 1 
South_14 0.390 0.488 0 1 
Urban_14 0.791 0.407 0 1 
preg 0.044 0.205 0 1 
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3.4 Estimation Results 
The results from fitting the econometric model are reported in Table 4, in which most 
findings are consistent with our expectation. 
The prices of meat and fish, alcoholic drinks, and health care services have a positive 
effect on women’s participation in the labor market.  On the contrary, the price of processed 
fruits and vegetables and the price of fast food have a negative effect, suggesting that higher 
prices of these substitutes for home prepared food reduce women’s likelihood of working for 
pay. Women with higher non-wage income are more likely to participate in the labor market.  
Women whose household has in the past participated in the FSP are significantly less likely 
to work currently.  Age has a reverse U-shaped effect on women’s participation in the labor 
market, with a peak effect at age 33.  Compared to white women, black women and women 
of other races are more likely to have a job.  Education level and noncognitive skills have no 
significant effect on women’s decision on the labor market participation.  Married women or 
women with more kids are less likely to work for pay.  Both parents’ education level has a 
significant negative effect on the daughter’s employment decision.  Women living in MSAs 
are less likely to work for pay.  Compared to women in Northeast and West, women living in 
the North Central region are more likely to participate in the labor market.  Women who grew 
up in rural areas or in south are more likely to work.  Finally, pregnant women are less likely 
to have a job. 
The estimated coefficient for Pr(D(empl)=1) is significantly differently from zero in the 
wage equation, implying that selection problem is important.  Age has a reversed U-shaped 
effect on female workers’ wage rate with a peak effect at age 39.   Compared to white women, 
black women earn much less (by 7.9%) while women of other races earn much more (by 
9.1%).  Women who have more education or higher noncognitive abilities earn a significantly 
higher wage rate.  Women who are taller earn significantly more, while early BMI does not 
affect current wage rate significantly.  Both parents’ education level has a significant positive 
effect on the daughter’s wage rate.  Women living in urban areas or MSAs earn a 
significantly higher wage rate.  Compared to women in Northeast and West, women living in 
North Central or South earn much less. 
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Women with a higher opportunity cost of time are less likely to participate in the Food 
Stamp Program.  The prices of fresh fruits and vegetables and fast food have a negative effect 
on the probability of participation, while the prices of dairy products and health care services 
have a positive effect.  Women with a higher non-wage income are less likely to participate.  
Households that have been in the program are more likely to continue in the program.  Age 
has a reversed U-shaped effect on the probability of participation with a peak effect at age 39.  
Education level does not have a significant effect on women’s likelihood to participate in the 
FSP, while noncognitive abilities have a significantly positive effect.  Married women or 
women with kids are more likely to participate in the program.  Both parents’ education level 
has a significant positive effect on the daughter’s participation decision.  Women living in 
urban areas or MSAs are more likely to participate than women in rural areas or non-MSAs.  
Compared to women in Northeast and West, women in North Central and South are less 
likely to participate.  Pregnant women are more likely to participate.  Households are more 
likely to participate in the FSP after 1996. 
Women in the households that currently participate in the FSP have a higher BMI and 
also a higher probability of being obese.  Other things equal, participation in the FSP would 
increase a woman’s BMI by about 1.1%, and increase her probability of being obese by about 
2.6 percentage points. 
Higher prices of processed fruits and vegetables, alcoholic drinks and non-alcoholic 
drinks increase women’s BMI and the probability of being obese.  A higher price of dairy 
products reduces women’s BMI and the probability of being obese.  A higher price of fast 
food increases women’s BMI, but does not have a significant effect on the probability of 
being obese.  A higher price of health care reduces women’s probability of being obese, but 
does not have a significant effect on their BMI. 
Those women who earn a higher wage rate tend to have a higher BMI and a higher 
probability of being obese.  Those women with a higher household non-wage income have a 
lower BMI, and they are also less likely to be obese.  Given the age range of our sample, 
women’s BMI increases as they get older, while their probability of being obese decreases as 
they grow to age 35 and increases after then.  Compared to white women, black women have 
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a larger BMI and a higher probability of being obese, while women of other races have a 
larger BMI but not necessarily a higher probability of being obese.  Women with more 
education tend to have a higher BMI and a higher probability of being obese, but, on the 
contrary, women with higher noncognitive abilities tend to have a lower BMI and a lower 
probability of being obese.  A woman with a higher early BMI tends to have a higher current 
BMI and also a higher probability of being obese.  Married women, women with more 
children and pregnant women tend to have a higher BMI and a higher probability of being 
obese.  Compared to women in Northeast and West, women in North Central and South tend 
to have a higher BMI and also are more likely of being obese. 
To sum up, most estimation results are consistent with the literature, especially the 
positive effect of the FSP participation on women’s BMI and probability of being obese.  
Some price effects are contrary to our expectations or common sense.  It may be related to 
the limitation of our price data, or to the fact that we can not control for the physical 
activities in the body weight model.  The estimate of the program effect on the body weight 
in this model is consistent because of the large sample size, but it is still usually questioned 
for failing to control some unobservable factors.  For instance, although we use some 
observed characteristics to index an individual’s attitude towards welfare program, they may 
not work well.  To solve this problem, we will take advantage of the panel data and use the 
individual fixed-effects model to get a more accurate estimate. 
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Table 4: Least Squares IV Estimations for Female Sample 
Variable lnBMI D(Obese) D(FSP) lnWage empl* 
D(FSP) 0.011* (1.731) 
0.026* 
(1.649) 
   
lnWage 0.082*** (5.003) 
0.189*** 
(4.645) 
-0.213*** 
(-5.362) 
  
Pr(D(empl)=1) 
   1.434*** 
(20.68) 
 
PR_FFruVeg 0.025 (1.533) 
0.059 
(1.430) 
0.068** 
(2.096) 
 -0.121 
(-0.604) 
PR_PFruVeg 0.069* (2.403) 
0.162** 
(2.274) 
0.014 
(0.243) 
 -1.179*** 
(-3.462) 
PR_Meat -0.017 (-0.631) 
-0.110* 
(-1.677) 
-0.018 
(-0.337) 
 0.549* 
(1.676) 
PR_Dairy -0.057** (-2.551) 
-0.122** 
(-2.217) 
-0.093** 
(-2.174) 
 -0.028 
(-0.105) 
PR_Alco 0.051** (3.040) 
0.071* 
(1.719) 
-0.024 
(-0.677) 
 0.375* 
(1.690) 
PR_NAlco 0.067*** (3.252) 
0.102** 
(2.000) 
0.061 
(1.514) 
 0.357 
(1.428) 
PR_FF 0.042* (1.797) 
0.010 
(0.178) 
0.138*** 
(3.037) 
 -0.578** 
(-2.091) 
PR_HC 0.023 (-1.478) 
-0.042 
(-1.048) 
-0.056* 
(-1.806) 
 0.343* 
(1.776) 
Inc -0.002*** (-4.830) 
-0.005*** 
(-4.576) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.718) 
 0.054*** 
(2.926) 
LagFS 
  0.241*** 
(79.80) 
 -0.382*** 
(-21.14) 
LagMiss 
  0.125*** 
(5.954 
 -0.327*** 
(-2.912) 
Age -0.001 (-0.262) 
-0.016** 
(-2.346) 
0.011* 
(1.764) 
0.140*** 
(16.10) 
0.150*** 
(9.023) 
Age2 0.0000 (0.876) 
0.0002*** 
(2.687) 
-0.0001* 
(-1.714) 
-0.0018*** 
(-14.60) 
-0.0022*** 
(-9.694) 
Black 0.044*** (13.68) 
0.043*** 
(5.395) 
-0.035* 
(-1.743) 
-0.079*** 
(-5.143) 
0.390*** 
(3.185) 
RaceOth 0.025*** (6.830) 
0.005 
(0.546) 
0.008 
(1.148) 
0.091*** 
(4.797) 
0.161*** 
(4.002) 
Edu 0.001*** (2.305) 
0.002** 
(2.216) 
0.003 
(1.598) 
0.008*** 
(5.308) 
-0.010 
(-0.900) 
NonCog Scale -0.001* (-1.932) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.380) 
0.011*** 
(3.510) 
0.039*** 
(9.910) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Height    0.004*** (4.375) 
0.001 
(0.361) 
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Table 4: (Continued) 
Variable lnBMI D(Obese) D(FSP) lnWage empl* 
BMI20 0.096*** 
(41.69) 
0.020*** 
(3.414) 
 0.001 
(0.068) 
0.027 
(1.012) 
BMI202 -0.001*** 
(-26.42) 
0.001*** 
(6.825) 
 -0.000 
(-0.777) 
-0.001 
(-1.266) 
Married 0.069*** 
(6.125) 
0.141*** 
(5.102) 
0.250*** 
(2.935) 
0.066*** 
(5.427) 
-1.598*** 
(-3.034) 
Kids 0.006*** 
(5.109) 
0.011*** 
(3.836) 
0.046*** 
(8.471) 
 -0.274*** 
(-8.159) 
Ed_Moth   0.010*** 
(3.835) 
0.016*** 
(6.411) 
-0.034** 
(-2.180) 
NoEdM   0.092*** 
(4.335) 
0.173*** 
(4.350) 
-0.338*** 
(-2.806) 
Ed_Fath   0.010*** 
(3.838) 
0.017*** 
(8.216) 
-0.044*** 
(-2.719) 
NoEdF   0.108*** 
(4.450) 
0.146*** 
(5.315) 
-0.521*** 
(-3.585) 
Urban -0.003 
(-1.246) 
0.0002 
(0.400) 
0.013* 
(1.670) 
0.065*** 
(4.231) 
0.032 
(0.704) 
MSA 0.001 
(0.597) 
0.003 
(0.504) 
0.068*** 
(6.269) 
0.052*** 
(3.842) 
-0.225*** 
(-3.444) 
NC 0.010*** 
(3.025) 
0.016** 
(2.002) 
-0.084*** 
(-5.031) 
-0.136*** 
(-8.678) 
0.398*** 
(4.108) 
South 0.015*** 
(4.992) 
0.024*** 
(03.390) 
-0.058*** 
(-5.488) 
-0.104*** 
(-7.359) 
0.102* 
(01.704) 
Urban_14   0.004 
(0.786) 
 -0.148*** 
(-5.187) 
South_14   -0.031*** 
(-3.687) 
 0.162*** 
(3.140) 
DUM96   0.046*** 
(4.702) 
  
Preg 0.064*** 
(14.09) 
0.045*** 
(4.027) 
0.061*** 
(7.133) 
 -0.151*** 
(-2.959) 
Time Trend   0.086*** 
(4.425) 
0.254*** 
(23.14) 
-0.222** 
(-2.199) 
Constant 1.378*** 
(28.21) 
-0.841*** 
(-6.965) 
-0.410** 
(2.238) 
-4.287*** 
(-15.42) 
0.258 
(0.242) 
Number of 
Observations  20,750 20,750 20,750 15,691 20,750 
R2 0.5299 0.2996 0.3917 0.4242 0.1007 
Notes: (1) z-statistics in parentheses.  (2) *** represents statistical significant level in 1%, ** represents 
statistical significant level in 5%, and * represents statistical significant level in 10%.             
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Chapter 4. Forward-Looking Decisions without Information Updating 
In this chapter, we develop a model of decision making by the head of a household who 
is forward-looking but does not update current and future decisions as information is 
accumulated on past outcomes. Hence, the household head maximizes the household’s 
lifetime utility, not one period utility, assuming no uncertainty. She/he makes decisions on 
life styles at the beginning of life and sticks to them in each period afterwards despite past 
outcomes.  The corresponding empirical econometric model is least squares IV with 
individual fixed-effects.  This model has become fairly common in the labor literature. 
4.1 Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model is based on the multi-period model of labor supply reviewed by 
Blundell and McCurdy (1999).  In this model, marginal-utility-of-wealth-constant labor 
supply functions, known as Frisch functions, provide an extremely useful method for 
analyzing lifecycle decision problems, and also lay out the theoretical foundation for using 
individual fixed effects in an econometric model. 
The representative household makes its lifetime decisions on labor supply, leisure 
activities, consumption (including food, medical care and other consumption goods), demand 
for health status and the participation in the Food Stamp Program according to the value 
function at time t with κ  representing the household’s utility discount factor: 
[ ]1,(),;(),;,,,,(max),( 1 +++= + tAVZFSSZLOLPHCFUtAV tttttttttt κφφ 2 
Here )(⋅U  is a strictly concave utility function of goods consumed, in which tF  represents 
the food and drinks consumed in period t, tC  represents all other consumption of goods 
excluding purchased medical care in period t, tH  represents the current health status of the 
household members in period t, tLP  represents physically active leisure time in period t, tLO  
represents other types of leisure time in period t, tZ  denotes the observable characteristics of 
the household, such as the household head’s gender, race, education, family structure, urban 
                                                        
2 Note that this value function implies two underlying assumptions.  First, it assumes intertemporal strong 
separability of preferences.  Second, the household can completely predict its income, the value of food stamps 
it receives and adult health status in each period.  
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residency and so on, and φ  denotes other unobservable factors affecting the household’s 
preferences.  In the utility function, food and drinks, other consumption goods, current health, 
and other types of leisure time are assumed to provide a positive marginal utility, while 
physically active leisure time is assumed to provide a negative marginal utility.  We also 
assume that participation in the Food Stamp Program has a disutility, represented by )(⋅S , 
since the literature has attributed a part of the decline in participation to the welfare-reform-
related stigma.  Specifically, with tFS  representing the value of food stamps the household 
receives in period t, the disutility function satisfies the following conditions: 
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In other words, if the household doesn’t participate in the program, the disutility associated 
with participation is 0.  If the household participates in the program, the disutility associated 
with participation is lower bounded by a constant 01 <c , and increases as the value of food 
stamps increases, which implies a positive marginal disutility.  To permit a corner solution for 
tFS , we also impose an upper bound 02 >c for marginal disutility. 
The household can improve the adult’s current health status by its choices of food and 
drinks, physical exercise and medical care services (denoted by M ).  Specifically, the adult’s 
health production function is a strictly concave function given by 
),,;,,( ϕettttt HZMLPFHH = , 
where eH  denotes the early health status of the household member, and ϕ  denotes other 
unobservable factors that affect the adult’s efficiency in accumulating good health, for 
instance distress and genetic predisposition for good/bad health.  Some foods, for instance, 
fresh fruits and vegetables that are high in fiber, vitamins and minerals, are called healthy 
foods because they have a positive marginal product on health output.  Some foods, like 
alcoholic beverages, nonalcoholic beverages and fast food that contain added sugar, and 
added salt and fat, are called unhealthful foods when they have a negative marginal product 
on health output.  Finally, in each period, the household receives an endowment of time T
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that is allocated to work for pay tL , physically active leisure tLP , and other types of leisure 
tLO , i.e., TLOLPL ttt =++ . 
By setting the price of goods C as 1, let P  denote the cost of goods with subscripts 
representing different goods and W  denote the real wage rate.  Then, the household 
intertemporal budget constraint can be represented by the time path of assets, A , as 
])()[1( ,,11 ttMtttFttttttt MPFSFPCLWBArA −−−−+++= ++  
where 1+tA  is the real value of assets at the beginning of period 1+t , 1+tr  is the real rate of 
return earned on assets between t  and 1+t , and tB  represents unearned-non-asset income.  
Note that since the food stamps can be used to purchase food and drinks, )( tt FSF −  is the 
amount of food and drinks that the household purchases out of its own pocket. 
Therefore, the representative household chooses consumption, leisure and labor supply 
by maximizing the value function 
[ ])1,(),;(),;,),,,;,,(,,(max),( 1 +++= + tAVZFSSZLOLPZHMLPFHCFUtAV tttttttetttttt κφφϕ  
subject to 
))(1( ,,,11 ttMttFttttttttFtttt MPFPCLOWLPWTWFSPBArA −−−−−++++= ++  
Thus, we have the Lagrange equation 
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Standard dynamic programming techniques yield the following first-order conditions: 
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Basically, these first-order conditions imply that the household chooses such that the 
marginal returns from these choices equal the marginal costs associated with them.  
Specifically, the first-order condition with respect to tFS  indicates that the household would 
choose not to participate in the Food Stamp Program when the marginal return from 
participation tFt P ,l  is less than the marginal disutility 
tdFS
dS
−  , and vice versa. The last 
equation is also called the Euler equation, in which tl  is the Lagrange multiplier of the 
intertemporal budget constraint, representing the marginal utility of wealth 
t
t
A
V
∂
∂ by the 
Envelope theorem. 
These first-order conditions imply that the demand functions for different goods 
( *** ,, MCF ), time allocation of adults ( *** ,, LLOLP ), food stamps tFS  and adult health 
status ( *H ) are of the form 
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where e  includes φ  and ϕ , i.e., all the unobservable factors that affect the household’s 
preferences and efficiency in accumulating good health of adults. 
The above set of functions reveals the set of variables that are to explain the above seven 
behavioral outcomes, and also provides the structural model for our empirical analysis.  
Goods consumption, labor supply and health status merely depend on components observed 
in the current period: the current prices of food and drinks tFP , , the current price of medical 
services tMP , , the current wage rate tW , the household current observable characteristics tZ , 
as well as tl  which summarizes the relevant information from all other periods.  Variables 
such as future wealth, wages, or personal characteristics affect current behavioral outcomes 
only through the change of tl .   
The Euler equation implies a time path for l  of the form 
ttttt br llκl lnln))1(ln(ln 11 +=++−= ++ . 
Repeat substitutions yield 
0
1
0
lnln ll += ∑
−
=
t
j
jt b . 
where ))1(ln( 1++−= tt rb κ .  Hence, tl in the outcome functions can divided into two parts: 0l , 
which can be treated as an unobservable individual fixed effect, plus tb , which depends on 
the interest rate and the household’s utility discount rate that can be captured by observable 
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individual characteristics (age and its squared term by Blundell and McCurdy [1999]).  This 
provides the fundamental structure of the individual fixed effects model that is incorporated 
into our second econometric model of obesity and FSP participation.3 
Comparative static results for the model are difficult to derive because substitution 
effects and income effects of various foods and consumption goods are unclear and also 
because it is hard to specify the characteristics of health production function.  For example, if 
the household participates in the FSP in period t , tl  will fall because of the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth while all future ttt >','l  remain the same.  Holding other factors 
constant, the household would increase adult’s other leisure time and consumption of other 
goods in the current period.  But it is hard to predict the changes in food consumption and 
physically active leisure time, and thus health status as a result. 
For another instance, if the household does not participate in the FSP and the price of 
medical care services increases marginally, holding other factors constant, the household will 
reduce consumption of medical services, and resort to a healthier diet (with eating more 
healthy foods and less unhealthy foods) and more physical excises to build up good health.  
The household will also increase the labor supply to compensate for the higher living cost, 
and as a result, the time for other leisure activities would decrease.  But we do not know for 
sure whether the adult’s health status will be better, be worse, or even remain unchanged, or 
whether the consumption of other goods would change at all.  When the household does 
participate in the FSP, since the food stamps can be used to purchase more healthy foods and 
less unhealthy food, it becomes more difficult to predict the effect of a change in the price of 
medical services. 
A marginal increase in the price of healthy foods will have stronger negative effects 
since the declined consumption of healthy foods does not only worsen the health status but 
also directly decreases the household utility.  The household will attempt to increase income 
and input of medical care services and physical activities to build up good health.  Again, for 
the households that participate in the FSP, if they can somehow offset the negative effects by 
                                                        
3 This economic model provides one plausible rationale for using individual fixed effects to represent random 
individual effects at the beginning of the decision making period.  However, other research might develop other 
rationales for using individual fixed effects models. 
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using the food stamps more wisely, the changes in their consumption behavior and health 
status may be moderated. 
The effects of an increase in the price of unhealthy foods are more complicated.  A 
marginal increase in the price of healthy foods reduces consumption, which directly 
decreases the household’s utility, but also increases the household’s utility indirectly by 
health benefits.  Thus, the net change in utility depends on which effect is dominant.  Some 
unhealthy foods, such as nonalcoholic drinks, can be purchased using the food stamps.  As a 
result, their price effects will be different for households that participate in the FSP and those 
that do not.  On the other hand, some unhealthy foods, such as alcoholic, can not be 
purchased using the food stamps.  Thus their price effects will be the same irrespective of 
whether the household participates in the FSP. 
Now let us take a look at the individual fixed-effect term 0l .  Inserting the optimal 
demand functions into the intertemporal budget constraint gives us 
])()[1( *,
**
,
**
11 ttMtFttttttt MPFSFPCLWBArA tt −−−−+++= ++ , 
which is an implicit function for tl  or 0l .  Although we cannot obtain the explicit function 
of 0l , we at least know that it depends on the household’s asset values at the beginning and 
at the end of each period, the unearned-non-asset income, the cost of goods, the real wage 
rate and all the unobservable factors that affect the household’s preferences and efficiency in 
accumulating good health of adults. 
Although we can make some predictions about household behaviors based on normal 
assumptions as discussed above, we cannot draw explicit conclusions.  Hence, the theoretical 
model provides only a broad framework for viewing household decisions on the economics 
of health and other choices. 
4.2 Econometric Model 
The econometric model focuses on adults’ choice of health status (Equation 5) and the 
decision on the FSP participation (Equation 6).  Based on the economic model, a system of 
these two equations is estimated with a focus on the effect of the FSP participation on the 
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adult health status -- BMI and being obese.  An instrumental variable strategy is used because 
of the endogeneity of the decision on the FSP participation. 
When estimating the system, we still need to control for the endogeneity of the 
opportunity cost of time measured by the hourly wage rate.  Hence, we fit an hourly wage 
rate equation (Equation 7) to estimate the predicted hourly wage rate and use it to index an 
individual’s opportunity cost of time. 
In the ordinary least square estimation of the wage equation, Pr(D(empl)=1) is included 
to control for selection.  However, in the individual fixed-effects model, which is assumed to 
be constant over all time, this variable will drop out.  Thus, we do not need to estimate the 
labor market participation equation. 
Equation 5: Health Status Equation 
Equation 5 is to explain the household’s demand for an individual’s health without 
information updating.  Based on the theoretical model, an adult’s health status depends on the 
household’s decision to participate in the FSP, his/her current wage rate, the current prices of 
local food and medical services, current observable characteristics (including marriage status, 
the number of kids in the household and current residence region), his/her age and age 
squared, and an individual fixed effects.   
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Among all these factors, we are particularly interested in the effect of the decision of the 
household to participate in the Food Stamp Program.  Based on a review of the literature, we 
hypothesize that adults who live in household that participate in the Food Stamp Program are 
more likely to be obese. 
Second, an adult’s opportunity cost of time is important to decisions on time and goods 
allocation.  If an individual’s price of time is high, then he/she will tend to conserve on time-
intensive activities.  Recreational exercise is a time-intensive activity, but it also contributes 
to a healthy weight.  On the other hand, individuals who have a higher opportunity cost of 
time may try to build their health more effectively and efficiently, if they spend some time on 
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physical activities, by hiring professional trainers.  Overall, we hypothesize that individuals 
who have a higher opportunity cost of time are more likely to be obese. 
Third, individuals consume food and drinks to obtain nutrients (carbohydrates, fats, 
protein, vitamins and minerals), to feel good (i.e., comfort food), and to socialize.  The local 
prices of disaggregated food and drinks are one set of factors that are expected to affect a 
household’s choices of food and drinks as well as it adult’s physical activities, and thus affect 
their body weight (Chen 2009).  An increase in the price of fresh fruits and vegetables is 
expected to reduce an individual’s consumption of these products and to lead to a higher BMI 
or probability of being obese.  An increase in the price of processed fruits and vegetables, 
which generally contain significant amounts of added sugar, will reduce the consumption of 
these foods and lower BMI and the probability of being obese.  An increase in the price of 
meats and fish is expected to reduce an individual’s consumption of these foods, which tend 
to be calorie dense, and may lead to a lower BMI and probability of being obese.  Similarly, 
since most fast foods are calorie dense, an increase in the price of fast foods is expected to 
reduce an individual’s consumption of these foods and thus lead to a lower BMI and 
probability of being obese.  We are uncertain about the effects of the prices of dairy products, 
alcoholic drinks and non-alcoholic drinks on BMI and the probability of being obese.  A 
higher price of health care is expected to shift attention to lifestyle production of good health 
and reduce the probability that an individual is obese. 
Fourth, there is strong empirical evidence that BMI tends to vary with age, generally 
increasing from young adulthood to the 60s and then tending to decline.  Hence, an 
individual’s age is expected to have a non-linear effect on ln(BMI) and the probability that an 
individual is obese. 
Fifth, an individual’s lifestyle choices are affected by his/her family structure. Married 
individuals or individuals with more children are expected to live to older ages and to choose 
healthier lifestyles, including a normal weight. 
Sixth, an individual’s current urban (versus rural) residence and regional location may 
affect his/her health supply because of the different costs of health production.  In more rural 
areas, including the North Central, West and South, space for physically active leisure is 
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cheaper, and space and good soils are more likely to be available for a vegetable garden. 
Finally, pregnant women tend to have a higher BMI or a higher probability of being 
obese. 
Equation 6: Food Stamp Program Participation 
Equation 6 is to explain a household’s decision to participate in the FSP, which is 
hypothesized to depend on local prices of food and drinks, the price of medical services, age 
of adults, marriage status of adults, and the number of kids at home. 
This equation is of interest itself but also to provide predicted probabilities of FSP 
participation for Equation 5. Two instrumental variables, an index of residence in a 
metropolitan statistical area and the household non-wage income, are used for identification 
purpose based on policies that set the rules for the Food Stamp Program.  We are not sure 
about the sign of the effect of residing in a MSA.  On one hand, individuals who live in 
MSAs may be less likely to participate in the FSP because of the higher average income level 
and less friendly attitude toward the welfare programs.  One the other hand, local 
governments probably are able to provide support for more people because they have more 
resources, thus resulting in a higher participation rate.  We expect that households with a 
higher household non-wage income are less likely to participate in the FSP. 
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Since the Food Stamp Program provides a substitute for some directly purchased food, 
an individual is expected to be more likely to participate in the program as the prices of 
healthy food increase.  However, we are uncertain about the effects of local prices of 
unhealthy food because they depend on the tradeoff between the reduced utility from less 
consumption and the increased utility from better health. 
Retirement-aged adults are expected to be in household that more likely to participate in 
the Food Stamp Program because they usually have less current income.  However, because 
they can obtain social security and Medicare when they turn aged 65, a non-linear effect of 
an adult’s age is permitted in the model to capture life-stage effects. 
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Married individuals are expected to be less likely to participate in the Food Stamp 
Program because they could get financial support from their spouse, but individuals with 
more children are expected to be more likely to participate because of the heavier financial 
burden.   
Equation 7: Hourly Wage Rate Equation 
Equation 7 is the hourly wage equation for adults, and it is also used to generate 
estimates of the opportunity cost of time for Equation 1. 
itiitititititititi SoutheNonCogScalAgeEduAgeAgeAgeWage ωdππππππ +++++++= 3654
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An individual’s age rather than his or her labor market experience is used to represent 
current and pass incentives to invest in experience, given schooling.  We expect an 
individual’s wage to increase but at a decreasing rate as he or she becomes older. 
Other studies have found that an individual’s wage increases with more cognitive skills 
(as indexed by education level) and noncognitive abilities.  In our data set, all the 
respondents were at least 22 years old in the first sampling year.  Hence their education level 
rarely changed as they became older.  Also, the noncognitive abilities scales were 
administrated far before the first sampling year, so they are fixed during all the sampling 
years.  Therefore, the interaction terms of age and education as well as age and noncognitive 
abilities are used in Equation 7 for two purposes.  First, the cognitive skills and non-cognitive 
abilities work as instrumental variables in Equation 7.  Second, the interaction terms allow 
for us to examine whether their effects increase or decrease with more labor market 
experience. 
At last, an index of residence in southern areas is used in the equation because 
individuals that currently live in a poorer area are expected to earn less. 
4.3 Sample Description 
We use a balanced sample in which each individual has complete records in all six 
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sampling years.4  There are a total of 1,638 individuals with 6 observations per individual in 
the female balanced sample (please see Table 5 for the summary statistics of key variables).  
About 56.5% of females are white, 28.8% are black, and 14.7% are of other races.  At age 20, 
these females had an average BMI of 21.74, and 2.2% of them were obese.  The female 
sample has an average education level of almost 13 years.  As for measures for non-cognitive 
abilities, the mean of Rosenberg Scale is 32.09, the mean of Internal scale is 8.35, and the 
mean of Noncog Scale is 13.70. 
From year 1986 to year 2006, the average BMI of these women increased by over 19% 
from 22.64 to 27, while their obesity rate also increased by over 20 percentage points.  This 
trend is consistent with the increasing obesity rate in the U.S. over that last twenty year.  
During the same period, the Food Stamp Program participation rate increased steadily to 
1994 and then dropped sharply.  The average annual amount of food stamps the household 
received in the last three calendar years also shows the same pattern except for a small 
increase in 2006.  We believe that these phenomena may be related with the welfare reform 
in 1996. 
The proportion of women who are married increased in the first two sampling years and 
remained steady thereafter.  The number of kids in the household increased until 1998 and 
decreased thereafter.  The proportion of pregnant women fluctuated at a higher level in the 
first three sampling years and then kept at a much lower level in the last three sampling years.  
We believe that all these changing patterns are normal as the respondents aged. 
The hourly real wage rate and the predicted annual real non-wage income both kept 
rising during these twenty years.  The residence location of these respondents didn’t change 
much except that the proportion of respondents living in metropolitan statistical areas more 
than doubled in the last two sampling years.  We are not sure if it is because more 
respondents moved to MSAs or because the U.S. Census Bureau revised the standards for 
MSAs in year 2000.  
                                                        
4 Just as in the least squares estimations with IV strategies, no significant effects of participation in the FSP on 
body weight or the probability of being obese are found for male adults in the data set although the instrumental 
variable strategy works well.  Therefore, our empirical analyses focus on the female sample. 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Female Balanced Sample 
Part 1: Summary Statistics of Key Demographic Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BMI20 21.74 3.04 16.14 39.48 
age (in 1986) 24.56 2.23 21 29 
Black 0.288 0.453 0 1 
RaceOth 0.147 0.354 0 1 
Edu 12.79 2.10 0 20 
Rosenberg Scale 32.09 3.97 19 40 
Internal Scale 8.35 1.49 4 12 
Noncog Scale 13.70 1.55 9.41 17.89 
Part 2: Means of Variables in each sampling year 
Variable 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 
BMI 22.64 23.79 24.77 25.67 26.37 27.00 
D(Obese) 4.46% 8.55% 13.98% 18.86% 23.44% 26.50% 
D(FSP) 13.37% 14.96% 16.24% 10.19% 7.57% 6.11% 
LagFS 119.45 201.19 288.20 234.32 120.57 152.72 
LagMiss 0.18% 0.37% 0.55% 0.49% 0.49% 0.43% 
Wage (if worked for pay) 5.99 9.57 10.43 13.62 17.22 19.49 
Married 44.44% 55.31% 56.47% 56.65% 58.55% 57.88% 
Kids 0.89 1.37 1.55 1.73 1.57 1.32 
preg 7.14% 6.29% 8.42% 1.59% 0.98% 0.24% 
Urban 79.30% 78.57% 77.84% 68.74% 75.34% 68.32% 
NC 28.51% 29.55% 29.61% 29.30% 29.18% 29.12% 
South 41.09% 40.72% 41.39% 41.94% 41.94% 42.06% 
West 18.75% 18.50% 18.19% 18.19% 18.01% 18.19% 
MSA 49.82% 48.66% 44.63% 30.40% 79.61% 91.94% 
Inc (in 1,000 dollars) 5.90 15.16 15.39 26.34 33.69 38.71 
  
53 
 
 
4.4 Estimation Results 
The econometric model is least squares with IVs and individual fixed-effects model, and 
estimates of this model are reported in Table 6.  Estimation of the wage equation differs here 
relative to the benchmark model because variables that do not change over time are excluded 
and captured in the estimate coefficients of the individual fixed effects.  A woman’s age has a 
reversed U-shaped effect on her hourly wage rate, peaking at age of 55, but given the age 
range of our sample, older female workers tend to earn more.  When both women’s cognitive 
skills and non-cognitive abilities are controlled in the wage equation, noncognitive abilities 
have a significant positive effect on hourly wage rate, while cognitive skills have no 
significant effect although still with a positive sign. 5  This means that for women, non-
cognitive abilities affect their hourly wage instead of their cognitive skills, and the magnitude 
of such effect increases as they get older.  No North-South regional differences exist in 
women’s real wage rates in the fixed-effects model. 
Women’s household FSP participation decision is shown to be sensitive to the local 
prices of fresh fruits and vegetables, fast food and dairy products, but not to the local prices 
of other food and services.  As we expected, a one dollar increase in the price of fresh fruits 
and vegetables increases the participation probability by about 11 percentage points, and a 
one dollar increase in the price of fast food increases the participation probability by almost 
20 percentage points.   But contrary to our expectation, a one dollar increase in the prices of 
dairy product decreases the probability of her household’s participation probability by almost 
16 percentage points.  A woman’s age has a reversed U-shaped effect on her household’s FSP 
participation rate, peaking at age 56.  Women with more kids are more likely to participate in 
the Food Stamp Program, which is consistent with the facts that, as in 2006, 52% of food 
stamp households included children; but contrary to our expectation, married women are also 
more likely to participate in the program although single-parent families are a mainly target 
group for the program. 
Both instrumental variables in the FSP equation, the dummy for MSA residence and the 
                                                        
5 The regressions using the internal scale and the Rosenberg scale instead of the comprehensive noncognitive 
scale show that female individuals with higher internal control earn on average more than those with lower 
internal control, which is consistent with the findings of literature. 
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non-wage household income, are statistically significant: women living in MSAs are more 
likely to participate in the Food Stamp Program than those not living in MSAs, and women 
with higher non-wage household income are less likely to participate in the Food Stamp 
Program than those with lower non-wage household income.  The test for weak instruments 
also suggests that these two instruments are fairly strong since the F-statistics for joint 
significance is bigger than 10 (Stock and Yogo 2005). 
As for the BMI equation and obesity equation, the signs of most variables are the same 
across the two equations, but the significant levels are usually different.  Women with a 
higher opportunity cost of time are less likely to be obese.  Women currently participating in 
the Food Stamp Program have a lower BMI or a lower probability of being obese on average 
than those who are not in the program.  But the magnitude of the effects is much larger than 
usual expectations.  Specifically, participation reduces women’s BMI by 15.67% and the 
probability of being obese by 56.33 percentage points. 
The price of dairy products has a negative effect on women’s BMI and the probability of 
being obese, suggesting that low price and popular use of dairy product may be a reason for 
obesity in the U.S..  The price of alcoholic drinks has a positive effect on women’s BMI, 
while the price of non-alcoholic drinks has a positive effect on both women’s BMI and the 
probability of being obese.  Contrary to popular belief, the price of fast food has a positive 
effect on women’s BMI, but not on the probability of being obese.  This result needs to be 
interpreted carefully because the food items we used in the category “fast food” do not 
include those frozen ready-to-eat meals available in supermarkets.6  The price of medical 
services has a negative effect on women’s BMI, but not on the probability of being obese. 
Women’s BMI increases as they grow older until about age 48, and then BMI decreases 
gradually with each passing year.  Given the age range of women in our sample, their 
probability of being obese increases as they get older.  Married women have a higher BMI on 
average than unmarried women, but not a significantly different probability of being obese.  
Women with more kids or being pregnant usually have a higher BMI or a higher probability 
of being obese.  Those living in urban areas tend to have a lower BMI, but the probability of 
                                                        
6 More and more female adults, especially those working for pay, purchase ready-to-eat meals instead of 
preparing meals using all fresh materials, which is believed to be a reason of obesity. 
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being obese is not significantly different for residing in urban areas or in rural areas.  
Compared with women living in Northeast, those living in the Midwest and West have a 
larger BMI, and those living in South have a lower probability of being obese. 
MaCurdy (1981) has shown that estimates of individual fixed effects contain useful 
information, not some much in their values, but in their distribution. Now let us take a look at 
the individual fixed effects in the BMI equation and the obesity equation.  Figure 1 presents a 
plot of the estimate of the individual fixed effects in the ln(BMI) equation. We can see that 
their distribution is looks similar to a normal distribution with a mean close to 0.  In Figure 2, 
we can see that the frequency plot of actual BMI and predicted BMI are similar, so the model 
of ln(BMI) does a good job in prediction except that the predicted values are a little more 
condensed than the actual values, especially in the upper tail.  As a result, for those women 
that have a large BMI, the predicted BMI is less than their actual BMI.  This under-prediction 
of extreme values is common in econometric models. 
Figure 3 presents the distribution of estimated individual fixed effects, and it has two 
obvious features.  First, the negative mean means that on average, the individual fixed effects 
tend to reduce women’s probability of being obese.  Second, the long upper tail suggests that 
unobservable fixed effects of some women make them very likely of being obese.  We also 
calculate two predicted probability of being obese.  The first one is the individual probability 
of being obese predicted by a woman’s own characteristics and her individual fixed effect.  
The second one is the average probability of being obese predicted by the sample’s “average” 
characteristics and a woman’s own individual fixed effect.  These values are plotted in Figure 
4 and their coincidence in the upper tale suggests that for some women, the individual fixed 
effect is the main factor explaining their being obese.  Put differently, for these women, the 
non-fixed effect variables are a minor part of the explanation of them having a large BMI or 
probability of being obese.  Hence, policies targeted to change these non-fixed effect 
variables would help little to decrease their body weight, while policies targeted to change 
individual fixed effects would work better.   
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Table 6: Individual Fixed-Effects Estimations for Female Balanced Sample 
(sample size of 9,828 = 6*1,638) 
Variable lnBMI D(Obese) D(FSP) lnWage 
D(FSP) -0.1567** (-2.14) 
-0.5633** 
(-2.42) 
  
lnWage -0.0312 (-0.72) 
-0.3485** 
(-2.54) 
  
PR_FFruVeg 0.0283 (1.24) 
0.1107 
(1.53) 
0.1090* 
(1.77) 
 
PR_PFruVeg 0.0381 (1.19) 
0.1119 
(1.11) 
-0.0401 
(-0.43) 
 
PR_Meat -0.0304 (-0.92) 
-0.1084 
(-1.03) 
0.0699 
(0.73) 
 
PR_Dairy -0.0593** (-1.97) 
-0.3078*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.1591** 
(-1.97) 
 
PR_Alco 0.0644** (2.38) 
0.0626 
(0.73) 
-0.0243 
(-0.32) 
 
PR_NAlco 0.0562** (2.06) 
0.2056** 
(2.37) 
0.0834 
(1.10) 
 
PR_FF 0.0913*** (3.29) 
0.1395 
(1.58) 
0.1993*** 
(2.88) 
 
PR_HC -0.0436* (-1.85) 
0.0095 
(0.13) 
0.0663 
(1.05) 
 
Age 0.0190** (2.52) 
0.0706*** 
(2.96) 
-0.0113*** 
(-2.43) 
0.1535*** 
(12.24) 
Age2 -0.0002*** (-2.79) 
-0.0006*** 
(-2.93) 
0.0001*** 
(1.52) 
-0.0014*** 
(-9.74) 
Married 0.0099* (1.68) 
-0.0140 
(-0.74) 
0.0604* 
(1.90) 
 
Kids 0.0082** (2.00) 
0.0270** 
(2.06) 
0.0614*** 
(15.58) 
 
Preg 
0.0652*** 
(13.96) 
0.0291* 
(1.96) 
  
Urban 
-0.0059* 
(-1.98) 
0.0056 
(0.60)  
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Table 6: (Continued) 
Variable lnBMI D(Obese) FSP lnWage 
NC 0.0259** 
(2.11) 
-0.0298 
(-0.76) 
 
 
 
South 0.0164 
(1.55) 
-0.0601* 
(-1.79) 
 -0.0574 
(-1.09) 
West 0.0209* 
(1.66) 
-0.0130 
(-0.33) 
  
Age*Edu    0.0000 
(0.66) 
Age*Noncog Scale    
 
0.0018*** 
(2.73) 
MSA   0.0326*** 
(3.96) 
 
Inc   -0.0047*** 
(-4.29) 
 
Constant 2.6821*** (26.09) 
-1.0361*** 
(-3.18) 
0.1179* 
(1.76) 
-2.4590*** 
(-14.77) 
Test for Weak Instruments 
   11.86 3.94 
Test for Overidentification in FSP Equation 
    Sargan Statistics 0.3838 2.2082   
    P-Value 0.5356 0.1373   
R2 0.402 0.105 0.061 0.531 
Notes: (1) z-statistics in parentheses. 
(2) *** represents statistical significant level in 1%, ** represents statistical significant level 
in 5%, and * represents statistical significant level in 10%. 
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Figure 1: Density Plot of Predicted Individual Fixed-effects for BMI Equation 
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency Plot of Predicted BMI 
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Figure 3: Density Plot of Predicted Individual Fixed-effects for Obesity Equation 
 
 
Figure 4: Frequency Plot of Predicted Probability of Being Obese 
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Chapter 5. Repeated Period Decisions with Information Updating 
In this chapter, we continue with a similar framework as in the previous chapter except 
in each period, the household head updates his/her decisions based on adult health outcomes 
in previous periods.  This assumption may seem more realistic for two reasons.  First, health 
status at the beginning of the period directly affects an individual’s ability to conduct some 
activities, such as consuming food and engaging in leisure activities.  Two adults facing 
exactly the same income constraint may make totally different decisions on consumption and 
daily activities if their health status is different.  Second, an individual’s current health status 
is a result of an especially complex process, including genetic characteristics (for instance, a 
small share of individuals were born at unusually high birth weights), long-term habits (like 
diet and exercise), and short-term health shocks.  In Chapter 4, individual fixed effects 
capture the effects of those genetic characteristics and long-term habits that are constant over 
time, but they can not tell us about the short-term health shocks.  Instead, last period’s health 
status can in part reflect the effect of those health shocks.  Therefore, a rational person would 
take advantage of the most recent information in repeating her decisions. 
The corresponding empirical econometric model is still the individual fixed-effects 
model, but as we will discuss later, some complications need to be solved for estimation. 
5.1 Theoretical Model 
We assume that the adult health status at the beginning of each period affects the 
decisions by limiting changes in current health.  As a result, at period t, given tA  and 1−tH , 
the representative household head chooses consumption, leisure and labor supply by 
maximizing the value function 
[ ])1,,(),;(),;,),,;,,,(,,(max
),,(
11
1
+++= +−
−
tHAVZFSSZLOLPZHMLPFHCFU
tHAV
tttttttttttttt
tt
κφφϕ  
subject to 
))(1( ,,,11 ttMttFttttttttFtttt MPFPCLOWLPWTWFSPBArA −−−−−++++= ++  
Standard dynamic programming techniques yield the first-order conditions as follows.  
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Compared with the set of first-order conditions in Chapter 4, current health status directly 
changes the marginal cost of food consumption, medical services, and physical activities by 
its effects on future utility 
t
t
H
V
∂
∂ +1  although it doesn’t directly affect the marginal cost of 
other good consumption, other leisure activities and food stamps.  Obviously, it also becomes 
more difficult to predict how these decisions would change in response to exterior shocks.  
However, the last equation, i.e. the Euler equation, remains the same, which means we can 
still use the individual fixed effects in our econometric model. 
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These first-order conditions imply the functions of consumption demands for different 
goods ( *** ,, MCF ), time allocation of adults ( *** ,, LLOLP ), demand for food stamps tFS  
and adult health status ( *H ) of the form 
62 
 
 















==
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
−−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
),;,,,,(),;,,,(
),;,,,,(
),;,,,,(
),;,,,,(
),;,,,,(
),;,,,,(
),;,,,,(
),;,,,,(
1,,1
****
1,,
*
1,,
*
1,,
*
1,,
*
1,,
*
1,,
*
1,,
*
elϕ
el
el
el
el
el
el
el
ttttMtFttttttt
ttttMtFtt
ttttMtFtt
ttttMtFtt
ttttMtFtt
ttttMtFtt
ttttMtFtt
ttttMtFtt
ZHWPPHZHMLPFHH
ZHWPPFSFS
ZHWPPLOLO
ZHWPPLPLP
ZHWPPLL
ZHWPPMM
ZHWPPCC
ZHWPPFF
, 
where e  includes φ  and ϕ , i.e., all the unobservable factors that affect the household’s 
preferences and efficiency in accumulating good health of adults.  In these demand functions, 
1−tH  captures all the information from previous decisions and affects the household’s current 
decisions on consumption, leisure and participation in the Food Stamp Program. 
5.2 Econometric Model 
The econometric model in this chapter focuses only on women’s choice of health status -
- ln(BMI) or being obese (Equation 8).  Based on the theoretical model, a woman’s health 
status depends on the household’s decision to participate in the FSP, her health status in the 
last period, her current wage rate, the local current prices of food and medical services, her 
current observable demographic characteristics (including marriage status, the number of 
kids and current residence region), her age and age squared, and an individual fixed-effects 
term.   
Equation 8: Health Status Equation 
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Some complications arise when estimating this equation.  First, we need to control for 
the endogeneity of the opportunity cost of time measured by the hourly wage rate.  Hence, 
we still fit an hourly wage rate equation (using Equation 7 in Chapter 4) to estimate the 
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predicted hourly wage rate and use it to index an individual’s opportunity cost of time. 
Second, as the economic model shows, the current decision on FSP participation is 
endogenous even when the lagged health status is controlled for.  Thus, as in Chapter 4, we 
use non-wage household income and the indicator for MSA residence to instrument current 
participation. 
Third, the presence of lagged health status causes potential autocorrelation. To 
incorporated this feature of the econometric model, we adopt the Arellano-Bond “difference 
GMM estimator” (Arellano and Bond 1991).  This method uses first-differences to eliminate 
individual fixed effects term, and then uses Generalized Method of Moments estimation by 
instrumenting the first-differenced lagged dependent variables by its past levels.  This 
estimator is especially designed for situations with 1) “small T, large N” panels; 2) dependent 
variable that depends on its own past realizations; 3) independent variables that are not 
strictly exogenous; 4) fixed-individual effects; and 5) possible heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation within individuals but not across them. 
5.3 Sample Description 
We use the same balanced sample as in Chapter 4.  However, because of the mechanism 
of the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator, one observation per woman is lost in 
differencing and another observation is lost due to using lagged health status to instrument 
for the change in health status.  Therefore, the size of sample is now reduced to including 
only observations from 1994 to 2006, i.e., 4 observations per person.  Specifically, for 
observations in 1994, the dependent variable becomes the change of health status between 
1990 and 1994, the independent variable becomes the change of health status between 1986 
and 1990, and the health status in 1986 is used as instrument.  For observations in 1998, the 
dependent variable becomes the change of health status between 1994 and 1998, the 
independent variable becomes the change of health status between 1990 and 1994, and the 
health status in 1986 and 1990 is used as instruments.  For observations in 2002, the 
dependent variable becomes the change of health status between 1998 and 2002, the 
independent variable becomes the change of health status between 1994 and 1998, and the 
health status in 1986, 1990 and 1994 is used as instruments.  For observations in 2006, the 
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dependent variable becomes the change of health status between 2002 and 2006, the 
independent variable becomes the change of health status between 1998 and 2002, and the 
health status in 1986, 1990, 1995 and 1998 is used as instruments. 
5.4 Estimation Results 
Table 7 presents the new econometric results.  Women who had a larger BMI in the 
previous period experience a larger BMI decline, and women who were obese in the previous 
period have a larger reduction in the probability of being obese currently.  Specifically, a 10 
percent increase in a woman’s last period’s BMI results in a 3.7% reduction in her BMI in the 
current period.  Other things equal, compared to a woman that was not obese in the last 
period, the current probability of being obese of a woman that was obese in the last period is 
lower by about 20 percentage points.  Because after controlling for individual fixed effects, 
last period’s health status mainly captures previous health shocks, these results indicate that 
there is adjustment to partially off-set the effects of previous health shocks. 
When a woman’s household participates in the FSP, she experiences a significant 
reduction in her current BMI and probability of being obese.  Compared to the results in 
Chapter 4, the magnitude of this effect is much smaller.  If her household participates in the 
FSP program, it lowers her BMI by 1.12% instead of 15.67%, and reduces her probability of 
being obese by 3.76 percentage points instead of 56.33 percentage points. 
Women who have a higher hourly wage rate have a larger BMI, but not necessarily a 
higher probability of being obese.  A higher price of processed fruits and vegetables results in 
a larger BMI and a higher probability of being obese, while a higher price of dairy produces 
results in a lower BMI and a lower probability of being obese.  A higher price of fast food 
increases BMI, but does not affect the probability of being obese.  For our sample, women’s 
BMI decreases as they get older.  Married women have a larger BMI and are more likely to 
be obese.  But the number of kids in the household does not affect her BMI or the probability 
of being obese.  Pregnant women have a larger BMI, but not a higher probability of being 
obese.  Unfortunately, because the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator differences out 
the individual fixed-effects term before the estimations, we can not get more information 
about the individual fixed effects. 
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Table 7: Arellano-Bond Difference GMM Estimations for Female Balanced Sample 
(sample size of 6,552 = 4*1,638) 
Variable lnBMI Obesity 
Lag.lnBMI/Lag.Obesity -0.3716*** (-31.49) 
-0.1987*** 
(-7.51) 
D(FSP) -0.0112** (-2.35) 
-0.0376** 
(-2.35) 
lnWage 0.4450*** (2.99) 
-0.1274 
(-0.26) 
PR_FFruVeg -0.0076 (-0.33) 
-0.0135 
(-0.17) 
PR_PFruVeg 0.0712** (2.15) 
0.2197** 
(1.99) 
PR_Meat -0.0185 (-0.48) 
0.0785 
(0.61) 
PR_Dairy -0.0578* (-1.85) 
-0.3368*** 
(-3.23) 
PR_Alco 0.0390 (1.25) 
0.0705 
(0.68) 
PR_NAlco 0.0149 (0.54) 
0.0367 
(0.40) 
PR_FF 0.1469*** (3.11) 
0.1374 
(0.87) 
PR_HC 0.0060 (0.23) 
-0.0187 
(-0.21) 
Age -0.0543** (-2.08) 
0.0454 
(0.52) 
Age2 0.0004* (1.95) 
-0.0003 
(-0.51) 
Married 0.0248*** (7.54) 
0.0304*** 
(2.78) 
Kids 0.0006 (0.38) 
-0.0003 
(-0.05) 
Preg 
0.0367*** 
(7.04) 
0.0011 
(0.06) 
Urban 
-0.0022 
(-0.72) 
0.0007 
(0.07) 
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Table 7: (Continued) 
Variable lnBMI D(Obese) 
NC 0.0226 
(1.45) 
-0.0119 
(-0.23) 
South 0.0445*** 
(2.72) 
0.0112 
(0.21) 
West 0.0116 
(0.74) 
0.0326 
(0.62) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test of over-identification restrictions: 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) z-statistics in parentheses. 
(2) *** represents statistical significant level in 1%, ** represents statistical significant level 
in 5%, and * represents statistical significant level in 10%. 
(3) The Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences is to test the autocorrelation over a 
4-year rather than a one year period.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we use longitudinal panel data to examine the effects of participation in the 
Food Stamp Program (SNAP) on women’s weight and probability of being obese.  We lay 
out the household utility maximization problem and the econometric models from three 
different perspectives and also conduct the empirical analyses consistent with these models.  
An instrumental variable strategy is used to control for the endogeneity of FSP participation, 
the previous period’s weight and the opportunity cost of women’s time. 
The effects of the FSP (SNAP) on body weight have been an important aspect in 
assessing the program’s impacts because the FSP (SNAP) is available to most people who 
meet income and resource standards and thus affects a quite broad and diverse population.  
Our review of the literature discovered mixed effects of a woman’s household participating in 
the FSP (SNAP) on her being obese. Although the earlier studies contained methodological 
limitations, they were still cited as evidence of the questionable value of the FSP (SNAP) 
program. 
We used three improved economic and econometric models and longitudinal data in our 
analysis of the effects of FSP (SNAP) participation on women’s BMI and likelihood of being 
obese.  Results from fitting the benchmark model, which is an annual model of decision 
making and close to those appearing in the literature, suggest that women in the households 
that currently participate in the FSP have a higher BMI and a higher probability of being 
obese.  Other things equal, if the woman’s household participates in the FSP, she has a higher 
BMI by about 1.1% and probability of being obese by about 2.6 percentage points.  Two 
criticisms of this model are that it is not life-time or long-run decision making and does not 
provide a rationale for including individual fixed effects.  These deficiencies can undermine 
confidence in these results.  
In the second and third models, decisions are made in a life-time utility maximization 
framework and the logical econometric model contains individual fixed effects, which gets 
free of the main problems of the benchmark model.  In the second model, a woman is in a 
household that participates in the FSP has a 15.67% reduction in BMI and 56.33 percentage 
points reduction in the probability of being obese.  Hence, the FSP participation reduces BMI 
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and probability of being obese in life time utility maximization, which quite different from 
the first model. 
In the third theoretical model, decisions are updated each period based on the previous 
period’s health or health shock.  The associated econometric model contains both individual 
fixed effects and autocorrelation in the health equation.  These results suggest that if a 
woman is in a household that participates in the FSP, it lowers her BMI by 1.12% and her 
probability of being obese by 3.76 percentage points.  Hence, in this third empirical model as 
in the second, FSP participation also reduces BMI and the probability of being obese. 
Although we still do not understand the underlying mechanism causing the weight loss, 
we believe that models two and three are preferred—when a woman is in a household that 
participates in the FSP (SNAP) program, she has a lower BMI and a lower probability of 
being obese.  Given the significant cost of the SNAP program, reducing obesity of women 
can be counted as one of its benefits, rather than an added cost, in policy discussions. 
We also find that prices of processed fruits and vegetables, dairy product, alcoholic 
drinks, non-alcoholic drinks and fast food, play an important role in women’s weight.  Our 
results suggest that an increase in the price of processed fruits and vegetables, alcoholic 
drinks, non-alcoholic drinks, and fast food increases women’s weight and probability of 
being obese, while a higher price of dairy products reduces them.  Because the demand 
schedule for fast food is expected to be negatively sloped, we expected an increase in its 
price to reduce demand and contribute to reduced obesity, but our findings were in the 
opposite direction.  A possible explanation for our findings is that we did not control for 
physical activities in our model because of the limitation of our data.  Because a change in 
the price would have an income effect causing a person to adjust his/her demands for leisure, 
which includes physical activities, the resulting change in body weight is hard to predict or 
interpret. 
These price effects suggest some policies that manipulate food prices to move women to 
a healthier weight.  For instance, if the program were to subsidize those healthy foods where 
a lower price increases the demand for them, this could lower women’s BMI and probability 
of being obese.  Also, the foods that are of the type where a higher price reduces obesity 
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might be designed as excluded from food stamp (SNAP) purchases.  This circumvents the 
resistance by the general public to directly taxing food. 
Another important finding of this study is that for some women, the individual fixed 
effect is the main factor explaining their being obese, or put differently, for these women, the 
non-fixed effect variables are a minor part of the explanation of them having a large BMI or a 
higher probability of being obese.  Hence, policies targeted to change these non-fixed effect 
variables would help little to decrease their body weight.  For example, for women who 
currently have a large BMI or are obese, on average it may be very difficult to manipulate 
prices or other things in their environment to significantly reduce their weight.  On the 
contrary, policies targeted to change individual fixed effects would work better.  Because the 
individual fixed-effects term mainly reflects the effects of genetic characteristics (which are 
hard to change) and long-term habits, healthy weight programs should target to the early 
development of self control, healthy eating, and persistent exercise patterns.  For instance, 
the USDA launched the SNAP-Ed in an attempt to help FSP participants make healthier food 
choices.  Although our results covering the period before SNAP-ED, this education program 
should make some efforts to help obese women improve self control and pursue a healthy 
lifestyle.  This would especially help those young obese women. 
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Appendix I: Prices of Food and Drinks 
1. Food and Drinks Items in Each Food Group  
Category Item  Weight Description 
PR_FFruVeg Fresh Bananas 0.509678 Price per pound 
  Fresh Potatoes 0.245161 10 lb., white or red 
  Fresh Iceberg lettuce 0.245161 Head, approximately 1.25 pounds 
 
PR_PFruVeg Frozen corn 0.083624 16 oz. whole kernel, lowest price 
 Canned Peaches 0.386760 29 oz. can, halves or slices 
  Fresh Orange Juice 0.445992 
64 oz. (1.89 liters) Tropicana or Florida Natural 
brand 
  Canned Sweet peas 0.083624 15-17 oz. can, Del Monte or Green Giant 
 
PR_Meat T-bone steak 0.237067 Price per pound 
  Ground Beef/ Hamburger 0.237067 Price per pound, lowest price 
 Sausage 0.221322 Price per pound, 100% pork 
  Frying Chicken 0.166892 Price per pound, whole fryer 
  Chunk Light Tuna 0.137652 6.0 oz. can, Starkist or Chicken of the Sea 
 
PR_Dairy Whole Milk 0.369760 Half-gallon carton 
  Eggs 0.067366 One dozen, Grade A, Large 
  Margarine 0.281437 One pound, cubes, Blue Bonnet or Parkay 
  Grated parmesan cheese 0.281437 8 oz. canister, Kraft brand 
    
PR_Alco 
Beer 0.498462 
Heineken’s, 6-pack, 12-oz. containers, excluding 
the deposit 
  
Wine  0.501538 Livingston Cellars or Gallo Chablis or Chenin 
Blanc, 1.5-liter bottle 
    
PR_Nalco Coffee, vacuum-packed 0.571906 
11.5 oz. can, Maxwell House, Hills Brothers, or 
Folgers 
  Coca Cola 0.428094 2 liter, excluding any deposit 
    
PR_FF Hamburger sandwich 0.333334 
McDonald’s Quarter-Pounder with cheese, where 
available 
  
Pizza 0.333333 11"-12" thin crust cheese pizza; Pizza Hut or Pizza 
Inn where available 
  
Fried chicken 0.333333 Thigh and drumstick, with or without extras, 
whichever is less expensive, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken or Church’s where available 
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PR_HC Office visit, doctor 0.425333 
American Medical Association procedure 99213 
(general) 
 
Office visit, dentist 0.425333 American Dental Association procedure 1110 
(adult teeth cleaning) 
  Ibuprofen 0.149334 200 mg, 51 tablets, Advil brand 
 
2. Example: Relative Price of Meat and Fish (PR_Meat) in San Francisco 
 T-bone Steak 
Ground Beef or 
Hamburger Sausage Frying Chicken 
Chunk Light 
Tuna 
Local Price 9.32 3.14 4.78 1.55 0.99 
Mean Price 8.91 2.30 3.38 1.10 0.69 
Weight 0.237067 0.237067 0.221322 0.166892 0.137652 
 
Then PR_Meat for San Francisco, CA is calculated as:  
316.1
137652.0*
69.0
99.0166892.0*
10.1
55.1221322.0*
38.3
78.4237067.0*
30.2
14.3237067.0*
91.8
32.9_
=
++++=MeatPR
 
which is 31.6% percent higher than the national average price. 
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Appendix II: Non-cognitive Abilities 
1. Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale 
 
Respondents were asked to select one of each of the paired statements and decide if the selected statement 
was much closer or slightly closer to their opinion of themselves.  
 
Pair One: 
A. (1) What happens to me is my own doing…………………………………………………………...…..1 
Or 
     (2) Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life is taking……...…...…2 
B. Is this statement much closer of slightly closer to your opinion? 
         much closer………………………...………………………………………………………………….1 
         slightly closer……………………...…………………………………………………………………..2 
 
Pair Two: 
A. (1) When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work…………………….……….....1 
Or 
     (2) It is not always wise to plan too far ahead, because many things turn out to be a matter of good or 
bad fortune anyhow……….………………………………………………………………......…...…2 
B. Is this statement much closer of slightly closer to your opinion? 
         much closer……………………………...…………………………………………………………….1 
         slightly closer……………………...…………………………………………………………………..2 
 
Pair Three: 
A. (1) In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck……………………….…….....1 
Or 
     (2) Many time I might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin………...……………...………2 
B. Is this statement much closer of slightly closer to your opinion? 
         much closer……………………………...…………………………………………………………….1 
         slightly closer……………………...…………………………………………………………………..2 
 
Pair Four: 
A. (1) Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me……………...……..1 
Or 
     (2) It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life……....…...2 
B. Is this statement much closer of slightly closer to your opinion? 
         much closer……………………………...…………………………………………………………….1 
         slightly closer……………………...…………………………………………………………………..2 
 
The following shows how the scale is constructed: 
Internal Control Item External Control Item 
Much closer Slightly closer Slightly closer Much closer 
1 2 3 4 
Each of the four paired items is constructed in this manner.  The values for each item are then 
summed.  The maximum possible score is 16, indicating high external control, while the minimum 
possible score is 4, indicating high internal control.  
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2. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
 
The questionnaire contains 10 statements of self-approval and disapproval with which respondents are 
asked to strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), or strongly disagree (4).   
 
A. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. 
B. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
C. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
D. I am able to do things as well as most others. 
E. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
F. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
G. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
H. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
I. I certainly feel useless at times. 
J. At times I think I am no good at all. 
 
The scale for each statement ranges from 1 to 4, and is scored in the self-approval direction: the higher the 
score is, the higher self-esteem.  Note that Items A, B, D, F, and G need to be reversed prior to scoring in 
order for a higher score to designate higher self-esteem.  
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Appendix III: Regressions for Household Real Non-Labor Income 
Variable Male Sample Female Sample 
Age -0.2638* 
(-2.73) 
0.0220 
(0.19) 
Black -1.0020* 
(-1.75) 
-6.4156*** 
(-9.24) 
RaceOth -0.7923 
(-1.00) 
-0.8383 
(-0.98) 
Edu 0.3808*** 
(7.55) 
0.5624*** 
(8.97) 
Internal  Scale 0.3366** 
(2.41) 
0.3885** 
(2.17) 
Rosenberg Scale 0.0454 
(0.81) 
0.2528 
(3.76) 
Married 14.6712*** 
(28.04) 
28.2972*** 
(50.88) 
Kids -1.5396*** 
(-7.22) 
1.7402*** 
(7.56) 
Ed_Moth 0.4252*** 
(4.57) 
0.8060*** 
(7.12) 
NoEdM 4.3620*** 
(3.27) 
5.4787** 
(3.15) 
Ed_Fath 0.3648*** 
(4.86) 
0.8350*** 
(9.15) 
NoEdF 2.4740** 
(2.47) 
7.3267*** 
(6.04) 
Urban 1.3250** 
(2.37) 
1.8291* 
(2.68) 
MSA 0.9750* 
(1.94) 
3.0919*** 
(5.05) 
NE 3.1375*** 
(4.18) 
2.7400** 
(2.94) 
NC -1.1559* 
(-1.74) 
-3.6869*** 
(-4.50) 
South 0.3808 
(0.47) 
-0.5583 
(-0.56) 
South_14 -0.8150 
(-1.11) 
-1.7893** 
(-1.99) 
Time Trend 3.9880*** 
(9.88) 
5.2818*** 
(10.81) 
Constant -15.8179*** 
(-5.80) 
-49.6669*** 
(-14.60) 
Number of Observations 16,687 16,866 
R2 0.1122 0.2736 
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Notes: (1) Dependent variable is the reported household real non-labor income. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses. 
(3) *** represents statistical significant level in 1%, ** represents statistical significant level in 5%, 
and * represents statistical significant level in 10%. 
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Appendix IV: Ordinary Least Squares Estimations for Female Sample 
Variable lnBMI D(Obese) lnBMI D(Obese) 
D(FSP) 0.008* (1.682) 
0.028** 
(2.416) 
0.006* 
(1.742) 
0.017** 
(2.089) 
lnWage -0.004** (-2.480) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.683) 
  
PR_FFruVeg 0.032* (1.754) 
0.061 
(1.338) 
0.019 
(1.123) 
0.044 
(1.083) 
PR_PFruVeg 0.117*** (3.703) 
0.265*** 
(3.362) 
0.101*** 
(3.568) 
0.247*** 
(3.560) 
PR_Meat -0.046 (-1.534) 
-0.149** 
(-2.019) 
-0.023 
(-0.866) 
-0.120* 
(-1.842) 
PR_Dairy -0.037 (-1.462) 
-0.0769 
(-1.228) 
-0.067*** 
(-2.999) 
-0.153*** 
(-2.805) 
PR_Alco 0.055*** (2.970) 
0.092** 
(2.013) 
0.060*** 
(3.606) 
0.084** 
(2.062) 
PR_NAlco 0.063*** (2.744) 
0.087 
(1.523) 
0.082*** 
(3.979) 
0.131*** 
(2.594) 
PR_FF 0.071*** (2.860) 
0.064 
(1.036) 
0.083*** 
(3.733) 
0.104* 
(1.896) 
PR_HC -0.002 (-0.118) 
0.035 
(0.808) 
-0.007 
(-0.449) 
-0.002 
(-0.054) 
Inc 0.0002 (0.923) 
0.0003 
(0.626) 
-0.0002 
(-0.839) 
-0.0005 
(-0.949) 
Age 0.0119*** (7.383) 
0.0115*** 
(2.861) 
0.0112*** 
(7.868) 
0.0102*** 
(2.902) 
Age2 -0.0001*** (-5.597) 
-0.0001*** 
(-1.924) 
-0.0001*** 
(-5.732) 
-0.0001* 
(-1.651) 
Black 0.056*** (16.74) 
0.074*** 
(8.794) 
0.052*** 
(17.24) 
0.059*** 
(7.998) 
RaceOth 0.036*** (10.22) 
0.038** 
(4.383) 
0.034*** 
(10.97) 
0.027*** 
(3.482) 
Edu 0.0002 (0.784) 
0.0006 
(0.844) 
0.0003 
(1.145) 
0.008 
(1.133) 
NonCog Scale 0.0004 (0.587) 
-0.0018 
(-0.984) 
0.0001 
(0.213) 
-0.0027* 
(-1.719) 
BMI20 0.0963*** 
(36.90) 
0.0178*** 
(2.741) 
0.0959*** 
(41.32) 
0.0192*** 
(3.367) 
BMI202 -0.0013*** (-23.43) 
0.0008*** 
(6.091) 
-0.0013*** 
(-26.50) 
0.0008*** 
(6.527) 
Married 0.011 
(1.547) 
0.006 
(0.355) 
0.020*** 
(3.226) 
0.030** 
(1.992) 
Kids 0.002* (1.894) 
-0.001 
(-0.193) 
0.003*** 
(3.788) 
0.005** 
(2.107) 
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Appendix IV: (Continued) 
Variable lnBMI D(Obese) D(FSP) lnWage 
Urban -0.004 
(-1.453) 
0.001 
(0.207) 
-0.002 
(-0.920) 
0.005 
(0.827) 
MSA 0.0002 
(0.071) 
-0.0025 
(-0.379) 
0.0002 
(0.069) 
0.0005 
(0.082) 
NC 0.015*** 
(4.373) 
0.030*** 
(2.002) 
0.012*** 
(3.745) 
0.020*** 
(2.650) 
South 0.020*** 
(6.454) 
0.035*** 
(4.405) 
0.018*** 
(6.294) 
0.033*** 
(4.694) 
Preg 0.064*** 
(12.46) 
0.038*** 
(2.959) 
0.064*** 
(14.14) 
0.045*** 
(3.970) 
Constant 1.210*** 
(26.91) 
-1.186*** 
(-10.61) 
1.234*** 
(30.97) 
-1.162*** 
(-11.84) 
Number of 
Observations 15,834 15,834 20,944 20,944 
R2 0.545 0.309 0.525 0.299 
Notes: (1) D(FSP) and lnWage are actual values instead of predicted values. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses. 
(3) *** represents statistical significant level in 1%, ** represents statistical significant level in 5%, 
and * represents statistical significant level in 10%. 
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